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Policy Research Working Paper 5100
This paper examines product market policies in Croatia 
by benchmarking them to OECD countries and 
highlighting how policies that are more conducive to 
competition would stimulate a more efficient allocation 
of resources and, in consequence, facilitate convergence 
to higher income levels. OECD indicators of overall 
regulation in product markets indicate that Croatia’s 
policies in 2007 were generally more restrictive of 
competition than were the policies in OECD countries. 
This is especially true for policies concerned with the 
degree of state control of the economy and with barriers 
to entrepreneurship. Regulatory obstacles to trade and 
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foreign direct investment, by contrast, are in line with 
those of pre-accession European Union countries (Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Slovak Republic, and Poland in 
2003, as well as Bulgaria and Romania in 2006), albeit 
well above the OECD average. Regulation of post, 
electricity, gas, telecoms, air, rail, and road transport, 
as estimated by the OECD energy transport and 
communication sectors indicator, is also less liberal than 
in the OECD, highlighting the positive knock-on effects 
for the rest of the economy that could derive from further 
liberalization of network industries.   
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1. Introduction  
 
Despite the progress achieved since independence, in large part due to the pull of EU 
accession negotiations, the income gap with the wealthier EU members remains sizeable. 
Income per capita has been converging towards the OECD and the EU average, with the income 
gap narrowing from 28 percent to 39 percent of the OECD average between 1993 and 2006 or 46 
to 63 percent (at GDP PPS) of the EU27 average between 1995 and 2008.  
 
In order to sustain growth and improve competitiveness, a second generation of reforms has 
been launched to help the country’s successful integration in EU and global markets.  A 
cornerstone of this reform agenda is the implementation of product market policies that are less 
restrictive of competition, in order to enable firms to put resources -both capital and labor- to 
their most efficient use.  
 
Adoption of pro-competitive product market policies would enhance Croatia’s ability to 
converge to higher income levels. In the long run, an economy where competition is restricted 
will be less productive because its firms will face reduced incentives to be efficient. In this 
context, Acemoglu et al. (2006) and Aghion and Griffith (2005) note how incentives to enhance 
productivity are crucially affected by institutions and policies that promote or hinder firm rivalry 
and entry of new firms. In particular, regulations that promote competition may increase the 
incentive and lower the cost of incorporating new technologies into the production process, as 
suggested by neo-Schumpeterian growth theories (Aghion and Howitt, 2005). Along similar lines, 
Conway et al. (2006) provide empirical evidence of the negative effects of anticompetitive 
regulations on productivity growth and, in particular, on the convergence to higher productivity 
levels using sectoral data for OECD countries; Alesina et al. (2005) emphasize the link between 
pro-competitive regulation and investment, while Bassanini and Ernst (2002) find a connection 
between anticompetitive regulations and innovation. Ultimately, the consequences of dampened 
incentives may be particularly severe for economies that are far from the technological frontier, 
since the ability to absorb new technologies is essential to allow convergence to the levels of 
more developed economies. 
 
This paper uses a number of benchmarking tools to assess the extent to which Croatia’s 
product market policies are restrictive of firm rivalry, entry and exit. This is done by 
benchmarking various dimension of the Croatian regulatory framework to a best practices 
worldwide, and, more specifically across the OECD and the European Union. Various tools are 
employed for this benchmarking exercise. The first is the OECD indicator of product market 
regulation (PMR), which offers a structured approach to benchmark the Croatian regulatory 
environment and will therefore be used as a blueprint to guide the assessment.
1 Complementary 
sources of information are provided by the World Bank Doing Business indicator, as well as, to 
the extent possible, by the Croatia Investment Climate Survey (ICS). The paper also includes a 
benchmarking of Croatia’s regulation in seven network industries (post, electricity, gas, telecoms, 
air, rail and road transport). This is done by using the OECD ETCR indicator. Regulation in these 
sectors is relevant, because it has cascade effects on the rest of the economy. Indeed, Conway and 
Nicoletti (2006) argue that regulation is most invasive in service rather than in manufacturing 
                                                 
1 The approach used relies on a methodology developed by the OECD (Conway, Janod and Nicoletti 2005), 
and the associated data which is available for all OECD members (2003), Brazil in 2004 (See OECD 2005), 
Bulgaria in 2006 (See De Rosa, Fay and Ilieva, 2007), Romania in 2006 (See De Rosa, Fay and Pauna, 
2007), Ukraine in 2007 (See OECD, 2007), and Albania in 2007 (See De Rosa, Sulko and Uregian 2008).   
Data for Croatia were collected following the same methodology in late 2007. Comparators include 
countries at similar levels of income and development, as well as high income EU and OECD countries.   3
sectors, since the latter are largely de-regulated in consequence of compliance with WTO and, in 
the case of European countries, EU rules. In addition to retail trade and professional services –
which are covered by the PMR - network industries are the object of the bulk of the state’s 
regulatory intervention in OECD countries. Furthermore, these sectors provide as much as two-
thirds of inputs for others sectors in the economy, implying that the regulatory burden in these 
sectors has broad effects across the entire economy. 
 
Not unexpectedly, we find that overall product market policies in Croatia are generally 
more restrictive than among OECD countries, all of which are richer and with a longer 
tradition of reviewing their policy environment to make it more conducive to private sector 
development.  Nevertheless, a number of interesting observations on the sources of Croatia’s 
ranking emerge from the analysis.  These can be summarized as follows: 
 
1.  In terms of regulatory obstacles to trade and FDI, Croatia, in 2007, performs along 
the average of pre-accession European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovak 
Republic and Poland in 2003, as well as Bulgaria and Romania in 2006). Its policies in 
this domain are more liberal than those of other middle income countries (Brazil, Mexico 
and Turkey) albeit more restrictive than the OECD average. Driving this achievement, 
substantial progress has been made in ensuring the equal treatment of foreign parties and 
in eliminating regulatory barriers to trade and investment. Average production-weighted 
tariffs on industrial progress have also been slashed to an average of around 4.9 percent, 
which is lower than all comparators. Regulatory barriers to foreign investment have also 
been substantially reduced. 
 
2.  Croatia is most restrictive in inward-oriented policies – meaning policies concerned 
with the degree of state control of the economy and with barriers to 
entrepreneurship.  This is due to a combination of factors: 
 
  State control over the economy is still significant.  The size of the public 
enterprise sector and the extent to which the state controls strategic decisions of public 
enterprises are among the highest in the sample of comparator countries.  In addition, 
although price controls have been substantially reduced during the first-generation of 
reforms, incentive-based regulation is still not the norm. 
 
  Barriers to entrepreneurship need to be further reduced, although they are not 
too distant from benchmark groups.  Actions could include:  lifting barriers to entry in 
network and utilities sectors;  further streamlining the licenses and permits system 
(notably by introducing the ‘silence is consent’ rule);  simplifying rules and procedures; 
and alleviating administrative burdens on startups by simplifying the incorporation of 
new firms and further liberalizing entry in regulated service sectors. 
 
  Further liberalization of network industries would alleviate costs for the rest 
of the economy, thus stimulating growth and convergence.  Despite progress in lifting 
barriers to entry and in reducing the extent of public ownership in energy, communication 
and transport sectors, regulatory inefficiencies in these sectors still represent a drag on the 
rest of the economy and impose additional costs on firm operation. This is reflected in 
regressions results indicating that restrictiveness of regulation in energy, transport and 
communication sectors has a significantly negative impact on income convergence. 
 
   4
The paper is organized as follows.  First, is a general mapping of Croatia’s product market 
policies guided by the structure of the OECD PMR indicator. The objective is to benchmark 
Croatia to OECD countries and outline the areas where divergence from average OECD levels or 
from selected comparator groups is the largest.  Second, is a more detailed exploration of product 
market policies following the structure of the PMR indicator. Third, is benchmarking of Croatia’s 
product market policies to OECD countries using the OECD ETCR indicators of regulation in 
network industries from the early 1990s to the present, with results of growth regressions 
including the ETCR indicator.  
 
 
2. Benchmarking Product Market Policies in Croatia: The OECD PMR 
 
Enhancing competition in product markets has been found to help increase GDP per capita 
by providing incentives to firms to reallocate resources to more productive activities, 
increase innovation and technological diffusion.  In addition, less restrictive regulations may 
positively affect employment by reducing the rents that some firms extract from overregulation 
and force firms to expand their activities.
2 
 
Benchmarking product market regulation has proved to be a useful tool for monitoring the 
performance of policies and institutions in OECD countries and for identifying specific 
policy gaps, thus offering the opportunity to benefit from the experience of other member states.  
Two surveys have been conducted so far collecting data for 1998 and 2003.  Results from these 
surveys point to a convergence in product market policies across OECD countries, with 
substantial improvements achieved by countries that originally exhibited relatively restrictive 
product market regulations, such as Poland, Turkey, Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, France, 
Mexico, Korea, Hungary, and Spain (Figure 1). Substantial improvements in easing product 
market policies have also been achieved among EU15 countries where the average PMR score 
fell from 2.1 in 1998 to 1.4 in 2003.  While this reflects the increasing harmonization of EU 
common market rules, the PMR benchmarking may have been instrumental in fostering this 
improvement.  
 
Figure 1: Product Market Regulation among OECD countries, a comparison between 1998 
and 2003 
 
Source: Conway, Janod, Nicoletti 2005. Note:  A lower figure indicates a better performance. 
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Product market policies, as measured by the overall summary product market indicator, 
are still relatively restrictive in Croatia compared to those of OECD countries.  Sim ple 
comparisons suggest Croatia still scores less well than the EU 15 average, although better than 
many of its peers did in 2003 (Figure 2).  Figure 3, which reports the summary PMR scores 
accounting for the uncertainty in the choice of weights used in the PMR system, confirms that 
Croatia falls into the group of relatively restrictive countries (which includes France, Greece, 
Italy and the Czech Republic as estimated with 2003 data).
3  
 
Figure 2: Product Market Regulation: Country Group Comparison 
 
Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, Turkey. Values refer to 2007 for Croatia, Albania and 
Ukraine, 2006 for Bulgaria and Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  For full data set see 
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Figure 3: Product Market Regulation - Country Comparison 
 
Note: Values refer to 2007 for Croatia, Albania and Ukraine, 2006 for Bulgaria and Romania, and 2003 for all other 
countries. The confidence intervals are calculated using stochastic weights on the low-level indicators to generate a 
distribution of overall PMR indicators for each country. The 90 per cent confidence intervals are calculated from that 
distribution. Indicator values for the 'relatively liberal' and 'relatively restrictive' countries are significantly different at 
the 90 percent level of confidence (Conway, Janod, Nicoletti, 2005). 
 
In order to identify the sources of restrictiveness of product market regulation, the PMR 
indicator may be decomposed in a number of broad aggregates (Figure 2). One possible 
classification distinguishes between administrative and economic regulation. The former includes 
reporting, information and application procedures, and the burdens on business start-ups, implied 
by both economy-wide and sector-level requirements. The latter includes all other domestic 
regulatory provisions affecting private governance and product market competition (such as state 
control and legal barriers to entry in competitive markets). 
 
Croatia performs relatively well in administrative regulation, relative to comparator 
countries. On the other hand, in terms of economic regulation, Croatia’s performance is the 
worst in the sample (Figure 4). This suggests that very little progress has been made in the areas 
of the regulatory environment that directly affect the incentives of economic agents, namely 

























































Figure 4: Economic and administrative regulation 
(a) Administrative regulation  (b) Economic regulation 
Source: see Figures 3, 4 and 5.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, Turkey. Values refer to 2007 for Croatia and 
Albania, 2006 for Bulgaria and Romania,2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  For full data set see Annex 






















A second broad distinction can be made between inward oriented policies and outward 
oriented policies.  The former include policies and regulations that determine the degree of state 
control and barriers to entrepreneurship, while the latter reflect policies and regulations that affect 
barriers to trade and investment.  A detailed description of what the indicators measure follows in 
the next sections. 
 
Compliance with the acquis communautaire in the perspective of EU accession and 
membership of the WTO have an important impact on both inward and outward oriented 
policies.  EU legislation must eventually be fully implemented in a wide range of domains as a 
precondition to participating in the EU-wide single market for goods and services.  Nonetheless, 
greater reform challenges, as well as greater cross-country variation, lie with the regulations that 
fall under the category of inward oriented policies.  Indeed, while implementation of the acquis 
communautaire is certainly reflected in certain aspects of the inward regulatory framework in 
Croatia (e.g. competition policy), many areas are still subject to a large degree of domestic 
discretion.   
0.4
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BOX 1: A REMINDER ON PMR METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Administrative regulation  Economic regulation 
  
- Licenses and permits   - Scope of the public enterprise sector 
- Communication and simplification of rules and 
procedures of administrative intervention   
- Size of the public enterprise sector 
- Administrative burdens on start ups: Corporations  - Direct  control over business enterprises 
(SOEs) 
- Administrative burdens on start ups: Sole proprietors  - Price controls 
- Administrative burdens on start ups: Sector specific 
burdens 
- Use of command and control regulation 
  - Legal barriers to competition 
  - Antitrust exemptions 
  - Foreign ownership barriers 
  - Discriminatory procedures against foreing 
firms 
 - Tariffs  8
 
Thus, average scores are lower (less restrictive of competition) across the board for 
outward-oriented policies than for inward-oriented ones.  This is certainly due to the 
requirements that are imposed by international agreements - such as the WTO charters, and, for 
EU countries, membership in the European Union - which are more binding in matters 
concerning trade and foreign direct investment.  Within this general picture, it appears that 
Croatia performs less liberally than most comparators in both inward and outward policies. 
However, certainly as a reflection of its international commitments, more progress has been 
achieved in the areas of international trade and foreign direct investment (outward oriented), 
relative to those that are more likely to be determined by discretional domestic policies (Figure 
5). 
 
Figure 5: Inward and outward oriented policies 
(a) Inward-oriented policies  (b) Outward oriented policies 
Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, Turkey. Values refer to 2007 for Croatia and Albania, 
2006 for Bulgaria and Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  For full data set see Annex I.   
 
 
3. Outward-oriented Policies: Barriers to Trade and Foreign Investment 
 
Compliance with international commitments may more easily impose discipline on policymakers.  
Indeed, this probably explains why all country groups do better on average in their outward 
oriented policies ratings than in the inward oriented one.  In the case of Croatia, observance and 
implementation of the rules for membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and, even 
more strongly, the European Union (EU) has led it to significantly reduce barriers to trade and 
investment since the start of transition. Croatia’s foreign trade policy has been driven most of all 
by the commitments of the EU Eastern Enlargement project, promoting bilateral trade 
liberalization initially with the EU and EFTA and, subsequently, with other preferential partners 
of the EU, including with the SEE countries.  The Pan-European Agreement on the Cumulation 
of the Rules of Origin has not yet been extended to Croatia which prevents further expansion of 
trade with the EU. However, the removal of tariffs on all industrial products and the 
harmonization of technical standards has led to Croatia’s participation in a de facto free trade area 
for industrial products. 
 
Despite the efforts made to harmonize legislation and regulation with international norms, 
both foreign direct investment net inflows and trade openness have remained stagnant since 
the beginning of the decade (Figures 8 and 9). Trade in goods and services has remained 
relatively stagnant at slightly over 100% of GDP, while average annual foreign direct investment 
inflows have hovered around 5.5-6% of GDP.  FDI has gone to a variety of sectors, notably 
financial services, telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, oil industry and trade and has made up 
1.3






































































































































































































for financing a significant portion of the BoP current account deficit, which exceeded 9% of GDP 
in 2008.  Looking forward, strong FDI inflows will be instrumental in ensuring continued 
macroeconomic stability and productivity growth.  Therefore, continued improvement in the 
business environment remains critical.    
 
Figure 6: Trade Integration in SEE and CEE, (2001-2007) 
 
Note: Data is from World Bank Indicators database (DDP) 
 
 
Figure 7: FDIs in SEE and CEE, (2001-2007) 
 
Note: Data is from World Bank Indicators database (DDP)   
 
Examining the various component indicators of outward oriented policies sheds light on the 
sources of the gap between Croatia and OECD CEE countries.  These include explicit 
barriers to trade and foreign investments such as tariffs, discriminatory procedures against foreign 
firms and foreign ownership barriers, as well as regulatory barriers such as the absence of 
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progress in reducing tariffs on imported good, there are still great margins for improvement in 
incorporating in legislation the principle of non-discrimination against foreign parties and in 





First generation reforms rapidly succeeded in eliminating all quantitative trade restrictions. 
The EU Eastern Enlargement project led to extending preferential status for Croatia’s 
participation in a European trade area.  As a result Croatia’s tariff levels (measured here as MFN 
tariffs on industrial goods) are much lower in 2007 than those of comparator middle income 
countries and in line with the best practice of the pre-accession OECD CEE (Figure 8).  In 
particular, Hungary and Poland entered the EU with substantially higher tariff levels than 
Croatia’s in 2006.  In addition, Croatia’s tariff levels have been lowered to those of the EU 
common market as of its entry into the EU as of January 1, 2007. 
 
Figure 8: Tariffs 
 
Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, Turkey. Values refer to 2007 for Croatia and Albania, 2006 for Bulgaria and 
Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  For full data set see Annex I. 
 
 
3.2 Barriers to foreign direct investment 
 
Barriers to foreign direct investment include foreign ownership barriers, discriminatory 
procedures against foreign firms, and other barriers to trade and investment, all of which 
are presented in detail below. 
 
Croatia has relatively low foreign ownership barriers. These take the form of statutory or 
other legal limits to the proportion of shares that can be acquired by foreign investor or of special 
voting rights that can be exercised in case of acquisition of equity by foreign investors.  Such 
restriction may apply in general or be limited to specific sectors that are considered ‘strategic’ 
such as air transport, telecommunications, and electricity generation. Croatia fares relatively well 
in this respect since regulatory barriers remain only in specific sectors, among which the PMR 
capture the 50% foreign ownership ceiling in the airlines sector, that fairly common across EU 
countries (Figure 9). 
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Figure 9: Foreign ownership barriers 
 
Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, Turkey. Values refer to 2007 for Croatia and Albania, 
2006 for Bulgaria and Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  For full data set see Annex I.   
 
This is therefore consistent with the finding that Croatia does not, in general, discriminate 
against foreign firms (Figure 10).  The rights of foreign firms in Croatia to appeal and redress 
through competition agencies, regulatory bodies, trade policy bodies, or private rights of action is 
equal to those of domestic firms, although there are no specific provisions requiring that 
regulations, prior to entry into force, be published or otherwise communicated to the public in a 
manner accessible at the international level, which may put foreign players at a disadvantage 
relative to domestic competition. 
 
Figure 10: Discriminatory Procedures against foreign firms 
 
Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, Turkey. Values refer to 2007 for Croatia and Albania, 
2006 for Bulgaria and Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  For full data set see Annex I.   
 
 
3.3 Regulatory barriers to trade and investment 
 
Croatia still has a plethora of regulatory barriers relating to international harmonization of 
standards and certification procedures  Whereas mutual recognition agreements with other 



















































regulatory measures performed in other countries to use internationally harmonized standards and 
certification procedures (Figure 11). Lagging behind in terms of use of internationally 
harmonized certification procedures may be partly explained by the fact that Croatia still has to 
fulfill its obligations with respect to the overall EU accession process. It is reasonable to expect 
that transplantation of the Acquis  shall implement provisions on multilateral recognitions of 
standards and certification procedures in many areas. Nevertheless, it should not be assumed that 
the problem will be eliminated in that way entirely. Figure 13 shows notable differences between 
EU countries with common history (e.g. Czech Republic vs. Slovak Republic). It also shows 
significantly lower barriers in non-EU countries vs. EU countries (e.g. Albania vs. Poland). 
Hence EU accession by itself is not a sufficient condition to believe that regulatory barriers to 
trade and investment shall be sufficiently reduced. This finding is of critical importance in the 
case of Croatia where other non-explicit barriers play far more important role than explicit 
barriers which are expected to be affected by implementation of EU standards. 
 
Figure 11:  Regulatory barriers to trade and investment 
 
Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, Turkey. Values refer to 2007 for Croatia and Albania, 2006 for Bulgaria and 
Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  For full data set see Annex I.   
 
 
4. Inward Oriented Policies: State Control and Barriers to 
Entrepreneurship 
 
Inward oriented policies in the PMR system can be decomposed into two broad categories: 
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Figure 12: State control and barriers to entrepreneurship 
a. Barriers to entrepreneurship  b. State control 
Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, Turkey. Values refer to 2007 for Croatia and Albania, 
2006 for Bulgaria and Romania,2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  For full data set see Annex I.   
 
Croatia performs quite well with respect to barriers to entrepreneurship.  Priorities 
concerning inward policies clearly lie with state control.  The legacy of central planning is still 
visible in CEE countries, since they perform comparatively worse than all other groups, although 
Euro zone countries, with a tradition of heavy state involvement in the economy, present not 
much lower values.
4 As a general trend, most of the OECD countries that had relatively 
restrictive policies in 1998 have succeeded in reducing the extent of state control in 2003 by 




4.1 Barriers to entrepreneurship 
 
Barriers to entrepreneurship affect firm rivalry entry and exit. They include barriers to 
competition, regulatory and administrative opacity and administrative burdens on start-ups as 
well as barriers to closing a business. These are discussed in turn below.   
 
 
4.1.1 Barriers to competition  
 
License and permit requirements or antitrust exemptions are more pervasive in Croatia 
than on average across the EU15. Croatia scores worse than the EU15 average in 2003 in terms 
of barriers to competition (as measured by license and permit requirements or antitrust 
exemptions), whereas it outperforms other MICs (Figure 13).  This is largely due to Croatia’s 
progress in incorporating EU and WTO rules and best practices in national legislation.  This 
resulted in the elimination of most antitrust exemptions for state-owned enterprises, with the 
exception of rules providing for exclusion or exemption from liability under the general 
competition law for provision of public services that is required or authorized on the basis of 
special legislation. 
 
Croatia’s score is around the EU15 and OECD averages in terms of other legal barriers to 
competition, such as explicit legal limitations on the number of competitors allowed in certain 
business sectors.  Croatia still maintains some legal restrictions to entry in network and utilities 
                                                 
4 See Tables in the Annex. 
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sectors (transport infrastructure; collection, purification and distribution of water; electricity 
generation, transmission, distribution and supply; and gas production, transmission, distribution 
and supply), which are fairly standard among other OECD and EU countries. Less typical of 
other countries are barriers to competition in the insurance and financial sector, beyond those 
imposed by prudential regulatory requirements. 
 
Figure 13: Barriers to competition 
a. Legal barriers (licenses and permit 
requirements)   
b. Antitrust exemptions     
 
Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, Turkey. Values refer to 2007 for Croatia and Albania, 
2006 for Bulgaria and Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  For full data set see Annex I.   
 
 
4.1.2 Regulatory and Administrative Opacity  
 
Some progress has been made in streamlining licensing regimes at the national level (Figure 
14a).
5  For instance single contact points (“one-stop shops”) for getting information and for 
issuing and accepting on notifications and licenses. On the minus side, the 'silence is consent' rule 
(i.e. that licenses are issued automatically if the competent licensing office has not acted by the 
end of the statutory response period) is not used widely.  
 
Croatia also fares well in terms of communication and simplification of rules and 
procedures (Figure 14b) compared to OECD countries.  The indicator captures aspects of the 
government’s communication strategy and its efforts to reduce and simplify the administrative 
burden of interacting with government. Regarding communication to the public,   systematic 
procedures for making regulations known and accessible to affected parties have been enacted. 
Also there is a general policy requiring "plain language" drafting of regulation; affected parties 
have the right to appeal against adverse enforcement decisions in individual cases; Government 
policy imposes specific requirements in relation to transparency/freedom of information 
government wide. Regarding simplification of procedures, there is an explicit program to reduce 
the administrative burdens imposed by government on enterprises and/or citizens, as wells as a 
program underway to review and reduce the number of licenses and permits required by the 
national government. 
 
                                                 
5 Note that, since accession, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic have continued 
progressing with their reform agenda implying that the gap between these countries today and Croatia is 
larger than what the 2003 data suggest.  For instance, in January 2004, Poland enacted a Law on Economic 
Freedom, reducing the number of licensing regimes from 9 to 5 and  introducing the ‘silence is consent 
rule’ in business registration and in various areas administrative regulation. 
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Figure 14: Regulatory and Administrative Opacity 
a. Licenses and permit system  b. Communication and simplification of rules 
Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, Turkey. Values refer to 2007 for Croatia and Albania, 
2006 for Bulgaria and Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  For full data set see Annex I.   
 
 
4.1.3 Regulatory burdens on business entry 
 
Firm entry and exit are two critical parts of the Schumpeterian creative destruction process 
which is a major prerequisite for a dynamic economy. High levels of firm turnover (the sum 
of firms’ entry and exit rates) are associated with higher productivity reflecting the fact that new 
firms with at least average productivity put competitive pressure on incumbents, leading to more 
exits but also to increased productivity amongst those that remain
6. Thus, the replacement of less 
productive firms by new entrants and the mobility of market share from less productive to more 
productive firms exert a significant upward push on overall industrial performance. Thus easy 
entry and quick exit of companies allows for competition to flourish and for an efficient 
allocation of resources.  
 
The PMR indicators show that administrative burdens on start-ups are still an issue for sole 
proprietor firms, especially for the number of mandatory procedures entrepreneurs have to 
comply with (16 in Croatia versus 7 on average in the EU15 in 2003). Number of procedures is 
also an issue to start a corporation (21 in Croatia versus less than 15 on average in the EU15 in 
2003). Requirement for specific service sectors -such as road transport and retail distribution, are, 
on the other hand, less cumbersome than both the EU15 and OECD averages. These sector 
specific administrative burdens assess the restrictiveness of licensing, registration and notification 
requirements, as well as technical, health and safety standards. 
 
                                                 
6 Scarpetta, S. et al. (2002), "The Role of Policy and Institutions for Productivity and Firm Dynamics: 
Evidence from Micro and Industry Data", OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 329, OECD 
Publishing.doi:10.1787/547061627526  
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Figure 15: Administrative burdens 







Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, Turkey. Values refer to 2007 for Croatia and Albania, 2006 for Bulgaria and 













































































































































































































































































































Croatia’s turnover rate has been increasing due to the rising entry rate but is still below the 
regional average. Firm turnover has increased from 3 percent in 2000 to 5.7 percent in 2007. The 
increase is accounted solely by a steady rise in entry rates from 2 percent to 5.5 percent over the 
same period, as the exit rate decreased from the high point of 1.5 percent in 2001 to 0.2 percent in 
2007 (fig. 1). The dynamic of Croatia’s turnover rate resembles closely that of Greece, but differs 
greatly from the regional one. Romania, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Turkey are all characterized by 
an above 10 percent turnover rate between 2000 and 2007 (fig.2). In 2007, Croatia’s turnover rate 
was 5.7 percent, whereas those of Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey were 13, 15.3, 16 and 
18.3 percent respectively (fig.3).  
 
Figure 16: Firm Turnover in Croatia
7 
 
Source: World Bank, Entrepreneurship Survey 2008  
 
Figure 17: Firm Turnover 
 
Source: World Bank, Entrepreneurship Survey 2008  
 
 
                                                 
7 Firm turnover is the calculated as the sum of entry and exit rates, where the entry rate is the ratio of 





























Figure 18: Firm Turnover, 2007 
 
Source: World Bank, Entrepreneurship Survey 2008  
 
Below follows a review of the entry and exit procedures, the reforms that the Croatian 
government has undertaken to date to accelerate both entry and exit and the suggestions on the 
way forward,  
 
 
4.2 State control of economic activity  
 
The privatization process in Croatia has been long, controversial in terms of its impacts, 
and still incomplete. The first phase of enterprise privatization, which was launched in 1991, 
was characterized by sales to insiders (managers and employees) and distribution to political 
supporters.  It did not provide the hoped-for boost to investment and growth, largely owing to the 
method of privatization used (companies were not transferred to those who could operate them 
most efficiently), but also because of Government’s unwillingness to impose financial discipline 
on privatized enterprises.  Instead of establishing hard budget constraints and pushing the chronic 
loss-makers into liquidation, the Government has kept bailing them out.  As a result, the list of 
state-owned enterprises slated for privatization—or re-privatization—remains long today, over 
750 companies. 
After taking off again in 2005-2007 period, enterprises with high state ownership remained 
mainly in shipbuilding and tourism sectors.  Many of them are loss-making, heavily indebted, 
and cannot survive without direct subsidies (including for working capital). Completion of 
enterprise privatization or liquidation has become urgent to create space for the private sector and 
to release the significant assets locked in these enterprises to more productive use. 
 
Croatia performs remains quite far from OECD and EU levels with respect to both the 
extent of public ownership and state involvement in business operations. The two measures 
of state control in the PMR system are public ownership and state involvement in business 
operations (through price controls and coercive, as opposed to incentive-based, regulation). On 

















Box 2: What the PMR survey means by “command and control” or coercive regulation 
 
The contrasting use of  “command-and-control” and “incentive-based” regulation appear to have been 
brought into common usage by Schultze who wrote in a 1977 lecture about economic efficiency: “We 
tend to see only one way of intervening – namely removing a set of decision from the decentralized and 
incentive-oriented private market and transferring them to the command-and-control techniques of 
government bureaucracy” (page 6) 
 
In this context, the PMR attempts to measure the extent to which the cost of new regulation is assessed, 
and whether alternatives are considered before implementing new regulations.  About half of the 
indicator weights are allocated to the following two questions (the full make-up of the indicator is 
provided in Annex table A2.5):  
 
Regulators are required to assess alternative policy instruments (regulatory and non-regulatory) 
before adopting new regulation. (Current answer: no). 
 
Explanation.  The use of a wide range of mechanisms for meeting policy goals, not just traditional 
regulatory controls, helps to ensure that the most efficient and effective approaches are used. Approaches 
may include green taxes and subsidies, voluntary agreements, information programs such as eco labeling, 
self-regulation, permit-trading schemes, and performance-based regulation (where a sector or industry 
must comply with a standard but can broadly choose how to meet it).  Note that the question only refers 
to whether the obligation exists as a specific provision in a specific legislative act, not whether the spirit 
of it is in fact respected.   A positive answer to the question would require the existence of a normative 
act explicitly ruling out regulation as the default option  
 
Guidance has been issued on using alternatives to traditional regulation. (Current answer: no). 
 
Explanation.  We understand that the first steps have been made to implement regulatory impact 
assessment (RIA) which is a step in the right direction. However, RIA has not been legislated to make it 
mandatory for a wide range of regulatory interventions and, most importantly, the RIA guidelines contain 
no provisions on how to use alternatives to traditional regulation. Lack of know-how and guidance how 
to use alternatives may prove to be a surmounting obstacle in an environment which is heavily used to 
more traditional coercive kinds of intervention.  Box 3 offers a discussion of alternatives to traditional 













Box 3: Alternative Regulatory approaches 
 
Performance-Based Regulations—specify required outcomes or objectives rather than the means by 
which they must be achieved.  Thus firms and individuals can choose processes that are more efficient 
and less costly, which promotes the use of new technology on a broader scale.  Such type of regulation 
is increasingly used in health, safety, consumer protection, and environmental regulation.  Drawbacks 
include measurement problems related to desired outcomes, higher administrative and monitoring costs, 
greater responsibilities for small companies to develop appropriate compliance strategies.  Most 
countries have resorted to the use of guidelines or “safe harbors” in conjunction with performance-
based regulation.  Guidelines provide information on appropriate compliance strategies, while safe 
harbors allow the benefits of certainty of compliance associated with prescriptive regulation to be 
attained, while also allowing more innovative firms to take advantage of the benefits of such regulation. 
Process Based Regulations—require businesses to develop processes that systematically control and 
minimize production risks. These processes are used in businesses with multiple and complex sources 
of risk, where ex post testing of the product is either ineffective or expensive.  Process based regulation 
is predominantly used in health, food safety, and environmental regulation.   
Co-regulation—businesses take the lead in regulation through endorsement and adherence to codes of 
practice.  This type of regulation is highly cost effective for the government.  Drawbacks include the 
possibility for encouraging anti-competitive activities by business or professional organizations.   
Economic Instruments—taxes, subsidies, tradable permits, vouchers and the like.  Economic 
instruments allow businesses to achieve regulatory goals in the least costly manner and provide market 
incentives which reward the use of innovation and technical change. 
Information and Education—most widely used approach to regulation in OECD member states; 
empower consumers to adopt actions or make informed choices to change their behavior.  Examples 
include campaigns aimed at reducing speeding when driving, anti-litter behaviors; reducing the use of 
drinking water; eco-labeling of products. 
Guidelines—issued by regulatory authorities, setting out processing or providing interpretations to aid 
understanding of government objectives by businesses and citizens.  Guidelines may accompany 
existing regulations, but also are increasingly used as stand-alone documents.  Guidelines, for example, 
are widely used in the area of consumer protection in Denmark.   
Voluntary Approaches—initiated by industries, sometimes formally sanctioned or endorsed by 
government.  They include voluntary initiatives, voluntary codes, voluntary agreements, and self-
regulation.  An example of a voluntary arrangement is the chemical industry’s Responsible Care 
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Figure 19: Public ownership and state involvement in business operation 
a. Public ownership    b. State involvement in business operations 
Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, Turkey.  Values refer to 2007 for Croatia and Albania, 2006 for Bulgaria and 
Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  For full data set see Annex I.   
 
 
4.2.1 Public ownership 
 
The presence of the Croatian state in the economy is pervasive, in terms of its size, of the 
number of sectors it is involved in, and on the nature of control it exerts over state-owned 
enterprises.  The aggregate indicator for public ownership covers size and scope of public 
enterprise sector, as well as direct control over business enterprises.  Given that there is much 
variation among EU15 or OECD countries for these indicators, we show the full set of 
comparators (Figure 20).  The figure suggests that whereas the size of the public enterprise sector 
in Croatia is not exceptional (although within the upper tier), the scope of state involvement 
(number of sectors) and the form it takes is among the heaviest in the sample.  
1.9








































































































































































































































































































Figure 20: Public ownership: size, scope and extent of control over public enterprises 
a. Size of the public enterprise sector 
 
b. Scope of the public sector 
 
c. Control of public enterprise by legislative bodies 
Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, Turkey. Values refer to 2007 for Croatia and Albania, 2006 for Bulgaria and 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































OECD average  23
To make this point, that the state holds equity shares in the largest firm in 17 out of 24 sectors of 
the economy considered in the PMR survey (Figure 20b).
8  As to the instruments of control used 
by the Croatian state in the sectors where it remains involved, they seem more extensive than in 
most benchmark countries (Figure 20c).  The similarity with Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak 
Republic suggests that transition countries have followed a similar approach in this domain.   
Direct control over business enterprises in Croatia has taken the form of constraints to the sales of 
state-owned equity stakes, special voting rights, and control of the strategic choices of public 
enterprises by legislative bodies (see Annex Table A2.3 for details). 
 
 
4.2.2 State Involvement in Business Operation 
 
State intervention in the overall economy is captured through price controls and “use of 
command and control regulations.”  The price control indicator measures the existence of price 
regulation or administrative control of prices in air travel, road freight, telecommunications, and 
retail distribution sectors.  The “use of command-and-control” indicator reflects the extent to 
which government uses prescriptive (as opposed to incentive-based) regulation both in general 
and in specific service sectors.  
 
Figure 21: State involvement in business operations 
a. Price controls  b. Use of command-and-control regulation 
Source: see Figure 3.  Note: Other MICs are Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Values refer to 2007 for Croatia and 
Albania, 2006 for Bulgaria and Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and 2003 for all other countries.  For full data set see Annex 
I.   
 
Regulatory processes do not sufficiently rely on incentive-based regulation. Price controls 
have been largely removed since the first phase of transition, placing Croatia below the OECD 
and EU15 averages in 2003 (Figure 21).  On the other hand, reliance on prescriptive regulation is 
much more pronounced than in most comparator groups or countries, on level with Poland’s and 
the MICs 2003 average. This suggests that this should represent a high priority for the reform 
efforts of policymakers. A detailed look at the make-up of this indicator shows that Croatia’s very 
high (poor) score is almost entirely driven by the fact that regulators have not issued guidelines 
on the use of alternative instruments before issuing new regulations. The use of prescriptive 
regulation is also the norm in a number of aspects of activity in the specific sectors included in 
the PMR approach (air travel, road freight, railways and retail distribution).  For instance, the 
                                                 
8 The indicator does not take into account the number of shares or the proportion of state ownership.  In 















































































































































































































universal service requirement for railways and domestic airlines drives a large portion of 
Croatia’s score in this indicator.   
 
 
5. Regulation in Non-manufacturing Sectors 
 
Regulation of non-manufacturing sectors in Croatia is pervasive and has important knock-
on effects for the rest of the economy. Non-manufacturing sectors represent around two-thirds 
of economic activity across OECD countries. Furthermore over the past two decades they have 
proven to be the sectors contributing the largest share of growth both in terms of productivity and 
employment in several OECD countries. Non-manufacturing sectors are also the area in which 
government regulation is concentrated given that manufacturing sectors have usually been the 
object of generalized de-regulation and liberalization associated with free trade agreements, such 
those associated with membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and, even more so, as 
a consequence of the adoption of norms from the acquis communautaire in countries that are 
members of the EU or in the path to accession. This is implies that final and intermediate 
consumers of non-manufacturing products across the economy have to bear the costs of heavy 
regulation in non-manufacturing sectors, with consequences for consumer welfare and efficiency 
of economic organization. 
 
The OECD indicators of regulation in the energy transport and communication sectors 
(ETCR) provide a framework to benchmark Croatian non-manufacturing sectors to EU 
and other OECD countries.
9 The OECD ETCR indicator system for regulation in non-
manufacturing sectors is structured around precise criteria. As for the OECD economy-wide PMR 
indicators, the overarching criterion to assess regulations is their effect on competition where 
competition is viable. The ETCR indicators assess regulation in electricity, gas, telecoms, post, 
air transport, rail transport and road freight. Sectoral indicators summarize information on the 
restrictiveness of regulation in four main areas: state control, barriers to entry, involvement in 
business operations and, in some cases, market structure. The resulting ETCR indicators cover the 
1975-2003 period in 21 OECD countries and –together with the retail distribution and 
professional services indicators covered in the PMR for 1998 and 2003 in 30 OECD countries – 
map the restrictiveness of regulation in non Manufacturing sectors. 
 
Regulation in energy, transportation and telecommunications is more restrictive in Croatia 
than in EU countries. The aggregate ETCR indicator reveals that regulation of non-
manufacturing sectors in Croatia is more restrictive of competition than both the OECD and 
EU15 averages (Figure 22a). However, Croatia appears to have made considerable progress since 
independence to make competition viable in these sectors. Most of these efforts are associated 
with Croatia’s progressive compliance with the provisions of the acquis communautaire relating 
to these sectors, which has led to convergence in regulatory frameworks. Convergence in 








                                                 
9 See Annex for a detailed description of the methodology of ETCR indicators based on Conway and 
Nicoletti (2006).   25
Figure 22: The ETCR Indicator for Croatia 
a) Aggregate ETCR  b) Disaggregated ETCR 
 
 
The gap in regulatory restrictiveness with the EU is equally large for barriers to entry and 
public ownership. The ETCR can be decomposed in its various components, thus allowing us to 
trace the restrictiveness of regulation to its sources. The dimensions considered are tailored to 
each sector and include public ownership and barriers to entry (see Annex). Under both 
dimensions, the regulatory framework in Croatia is more restrictive than the EU and OECD 
averages (Figure 23). 
 
Figure 23: Barriers to entry and public ownership 
a) Entry Barriers  b) Public Ownership 
 
 
Product market policies that are more conducive to competition would have a significant 
impact on Croatia’s convergence to higher income levels. Conway et al. (2006) show that the 
ETCR is highly correlated with the overall restrictiveness of a country’s regulatory environment 
across OECD countries. This allows using the ETCR in regression analysis as a proxy for the 
degree to which overall product market policies restrict competition. Simulations based on 
regression analysis conducted for Croatia indicate that a reduction of the regulatory burden as 
represented by the ETCR indicator to the less restrictive level of the EU15 would be associated 
with an increase in the level of GDP per capita of between 1.35% and 2.77% (Figure 24). As 
argued by Conway et al. (2006), restrictive product market regulation negatively affects income 
convergence by slowing the process of adjustment through which positive productivity shocks 
diffuse across borders and new technologies are incorporated into the production process. 
Furthermore, Conway et al (2006) show that the gains from further product market reform are 
more significant the more distant a country is from the productivity frontier. For a country like 
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going to multiply and amplify exogenous shocks, thus highlighting the importance of a more 
competitive regulatory environment for continued convergence. 
 
Figure 24: Simulation of the effect of ETCR on GDP 
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Annex I: The PMR Methodology 
 
A regulatory environment propitious to competition in product markets is widely believed to have 
positive repercussions on long run economic performance (Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2003) and 
productivity convergence (Conway et al. 2006 and 2007).  This may occur by promoting a more 
efficient allocation of resources both across and within sectors.  A more competitive environment 
may also stimulate innovation and technological diffusion, thus enhancing dynamic efficiency 
(Aghion et al. 2001). 
 
Product market regulation (PMR) is measurable through a methodology developed at the OECD 
relying on the OECD regulatory indicators questionnaire.  The methodology and key findings of 
the PMR for OECD countries are presented in Nicoletti et al. (1999) and Conway et al. (2005).  
The PMR indicators summarize information on economy-wide and industry-specific regulatory 
provisions.  
 
The PMR indicators are designed to reflect regulations that have the potential to restrict 
competition in areas where competition is viable.  By construction, they have a number of 
features which make them useful not only for analysis, but, more importantly, for policy advice, 
since they allow to pinpoint specific policies that hamper competition in product markets.  First, 
PMR indicators are focused on enacted policies and not on outcomes, implying that they are 
‘objective’, in that they are not based on opinion surveys.  Second, since the summary PMR 
indicator is constructed as the average of well defined components, PMR scores can be related to 
specific underlying policies, thus providing precise inputs in the phase of policy recommendation.  
Finally, PMR indicators focus on regulatory measures that affect the economy at large and can 
therefore be considered as comprehensive measures of regulatory restrictiveness.  Their 
advantages notwithstanding, PMR indicators are not designed to capture informal regulatory 
practices nor the effective enforcement of regulations, since they are only concerned with formal 
compliance with a number of criteria. 
 
Data was collected for Croatia for the purpose of the present exercise on the basis of the OECD 
product market regulation questionnaire.
10 The first section deals with general regulatory policy 
issues, concerning public ownership; market access and competition issues; market structure and 
vertical relationships in utilities and other network industries.  The second section covers 
regulatory and administrative policies, such as processes and capacities in the public 
administration.  The third section covers administrative requirements for start-ups, both sole 
proprietors and corporations. The fourth section deals with the regulation of professional services 
(accountancy, legal, engineering, architectural). The fifth section covers regulation in 
transportation industries, focusing on market access, business conduct, and market structure in 
road freight, railways and passenger air travel.  The final section covers regulation in retail 
distribution, focusing on the regulatory environment, industry behavior and prices.  Information 
from Doing Business 2006 was used for a fifth section of the PMR - administrative burdens on 
startups.   
 
The structure of the PMR system is shown in Figure 2.  The system is composed of 16 basic or 
‘low-level’ indicators, each capturing a specific aspect of the regulatory regime as described in 
Box 1.  The basic indicators are progressively aggregated in more comprehensive policy areas.  
                                                 
10 Annex 2 presents responses to the OECD questionnaire provides the responses for Croatia and 
comparators .   30
The highest level of aggregation corresponds to the summary measure of product market 




Figure 1: The PMR indicator system 
 
  
Source: Conway et al. (2005)
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Box A1. The low-level PMR indicators 
There are 16 low-level indicators in the PMR system. These indicators cover a wide range of product market policies and 
include:  
INWARD ORIENTED POLICIES 
State control: Public ownership  
Scope of public enterprises: this indicator measures the pervasiveness of state ownership across business sectors as the proportion of 
sectors in which the state has an equity stake in at least one firm. 
  Size of public enterprise: reflects the overall size of state-owned enterprises relative to the size of the economy. 
  Direct control over business enterprises: measures the existence of government special voting rights in privately-owned firms, 
constraints on the sale of state-owned equity stakes, and the extent to which legislative bodies control the strategic choices of 
public enterprises.  
State control: Involvement in business operations 
 Price  controls: reflects the extent of price controls in specific sectors. 
  Use of command and control regulation: indicates the extent to which government uses coercive (as opposed to incentive-
based) regulation in general and in specific service sectors. 
Barriers to entrepreneurship: Regulatory and administrative opacity  
  Licenses and permits systems: reflects the use of ‘one-stop shops’ and ‘silence is consent’ rules for getting information on and 
issuing licenses and permits. 
  Communication and simplification of rules and procedures: reflects aspects of government’s communication strategy and 
efforts to reduce and simplify the administrative burden of interacting with government. 
Barriers to entrepreneurship: Administrative burden on corporations 
  Administrative burdens for corporations: measures the administrative burdens on the creation of corporations. 
  Administrative burdens for sole proprietors: measures the administrative burdens on the creation of sole proprietor firms. 
  Sector-specific administrative burdens: reflects administrative burdens in the road transport and retail distribution sectors. 
OUTWARD ORIENTED POLICIES 
Barriers to entrepreneurship: Barriers to competition 
  Legal barriers: measures the scope of explicit legal limitations on the number of competitors allowed in a wide range of 
business sectors. 
  Antitrust exemptions: measures the scope of exemptions to competition law for public enterprises. 
Barriers to trade and investment: Explicit barriers  
 Tariffs: calculated as the (simple) average of most-favoured-nation tariffs.  
  Foreign Ownership barriers: reflects legal restrictions on foreign acquisition of equity in public and private firms and in the 
telecommunications and airlines sectors. 
  Discriminatory procedures: reflects the extent of discrimination against foreign firms at the procedural level. 
Barriers to trade and investment: Regulatory barriers  
  Regulatory barriers: reflects other barriers to international trade (e.g.  international harmonisation, mutual recognition 
agreements). 
_______________________________ 
Source: reproduced from Conway, Janod and Nicoletti, 2005 
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The indicators are calculated on the basis of the qualitative and quantitative information obtained 
from questionnaire answers.  Qualitative data are assigned a numerical value that allows ordering 
each of the possible responses to a given question.  Quantitative information is ranked by 
subdividing it into categories based on a system of thresholds.  The coded information is then 
normalized over a scale of zero to six.  These data are then aggregated into basic or ‘low-level’ 
indicators by assigning subjective weights to the various regulatory requirements.  Given the 
normalization of the basic data, all the low-level indicators also have a scale of zero to six, 
reflecting increasing restrictiveness of regulatory areas.
11  
 
Basic indicators are then aggregated into broader regulatory domains.  Higher level indicators are 
calculated as weighted averages of their constituent lower level indicators.  The attribution of 
lower-level indicators to each higher-level indicator, and the weights used in the aggregation, are 
based on principal component analysis (Nicoletti et al., 1999).  At the highest level of aggregation 
the overall indicator of product market regulation summarizes the restrictiveness of the regulatory 
framework in the product market.  The structure of the PMR system, with progressive levels of 
aggregation, has the advantage of allowing a decomposition of higher-level indicators, with an 
increasing degree of detail, into the values of the more disaggregated indicators, each 
corresponding to specific regulatory provisions. 
 
Data refer to the fourth quarter of 2007 for Croatia and Albania, to the second quarter of 2006 for 
Bulgaria and Romania, to end-2003 for OECD countries and 2004 for Brazil. 
 
As to benchmarks, the most obvious ones for Croatia are Bulgaria and Romania, who accessed 
the EU in 2007, and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that are also OECD members 
and that accessed the EU in a prior wave in 2004. These include the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and the Slovak Republic and we refer to them as the OECD CEE.  The fact that the data 
for Bulgaria and Romania and for the OECD CEE are from 2006 and 2003 respectively, when 
these countries had not yet completely fulfilled the legislative and regulatory obligations 
connected with EU membership makes them interesting benchmarks.  Nevertheless, when 
assessing Croatia’s relative performance, it should be kept in mind that the OECD CEE countries 
are likely to have made further substantial progress in various areas of product market regulation 
since EU accession.  
 
Extension of the benchmarking exercise to Brazil, Mexico and Turkey offers a broader 
perspective on other middle income countries (MICs) with different historical experiences.   




These benchmarks are used in the graphs.  However, Croatia’s score relative to the full sample of 
countries (30 OECD members plus Brazil, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania) is shown in 
Annex I for all PMR indicators.   
 
 
                                                 
11 The calculation of low-level indicators, including the weights used, is based on Conway et al. (2005). 
12 EU15 countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.   33
 Comparisons with full sample 
 
Table A1. 1: PMR 







Australia 0.9  0.9  0.9 
United Kingdom  0.9  1.2  0.5 
Iceland 1.0  1.4  0.4 
United States  1.0  1.2  0.8 
Ireland 1.1  1.4  0.6 
Denmark 1.1  1.3  0.9 
New Zealand  1.1  1.3  0.9 
Canada 1.2  1.2  1.2 
Albania 1.2  1.7  0.5 
Sweden 1.2  1.5  0.9 
Luxembourg 1.3  1.6  0.8 
Japan 1.3  1.5  1.0 
Finland 1.3  1.7  0.8 
Belgium 1.4  2.0  0.5 
Netherlands 1.4  1.8  0.8 
Austria 1.4  1.8  0.8 
Slovak Republic  1.4  1.3  1.5 
Germany 1.4  1.9  0.8 
Norway 1.5  1.9  0.9 
Korea 1.5  1.7  1.3 
Portugal 1.6  2.0  0.9 
Spain 1.6  2.1  0.9 
Romania 1.6  1.8  1.4 
Switzerland 1.7  2.1  1.1 
France 1.7  2.1  1.1 
Czech Republic  1.7  2.2  1.1 
Bulgaria 1.8  2.1  1.4 
Greece 1.8  2.2  1.3 
Italy 1.9  2.3  1.3 
Brazil 1.9  1.8  1.9 
Hungary 2.0  2.4  1.5 
Croatia 2.0  2.4  1.5 
Mexico 2.2  2.1  2.3 
Turkey 2.3  2.6  1.8 
Poland 2.8  2.9  2.5 
NOTE: The values of indicators refer to 2007 for Albania and Croatia, 2006 for Bulgaria and 
Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 for all other countries (Conway et al. 2005). 
 
 
   34
Table A1. 2 State Control 
 
   State control  Public ownership  Involvement in 
business operation 
Australia 0.6  0.8  0.3 
Iceland 1.1  1.8  0.3 
United States  1.2  1.2  1.2 
Denmark 1.3  1.7  0.8 
Slovak Republic  1.4  1.9  0.8 
New Zealand  1.4  1.9  0.8 
Japan 1.5  0.8  2.4 
Canada 1.7  1.7  1.5 
Korea 1.7  1.8  1.5 
United Kingdom  1.7  1.9  1.6 
Mexico 1.9  2.3  1.4 
Sweden 1.9  2.2  1.6 
Netherlands 1.9  2.5  1.2 
Austria 1.9  2.2  1.6 
Ireland 2.0  1.8  2.1 
Luxembourg 2.0  2.6  1.2 
Albania 2.2  2.4  1.9 
Germany 2.2  2.8  1.5 
Switzerland 2.2  2.4  2.1 
Finland 2.3  3.2  1.3 
Belgium 2.4  2.2  2.6 
Brazil 2.4  2.1  2.8 
Czech Republic  2.5  3.0  1.9 
France 2.7  3.3  1.9 
Spain 2.7  2.7  2.7 
Portugal 2.7  3.1  2.2 
Norway 2.8  3.5  1.8 
Greece 2.8  2.4  3.3 
Turkey 2.8  3.1  2.5 
Italy 3.2  3.8  2.3 
Bulgaria 3.2  3.5  2.8 
Romania 3.2  4.1  2.2 
Hungary 3.3  3.8  2.6 
Croatia 3.5  4.2  2.6 
Poland 3.6  4.2  2.8 
NOTE: The values of indicators refer to 2007 for Albania and Croatia, 2006 for Bulgaria and 
Romania,  2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 for all other countries (Conway et al. 2005).   35
Table A1. 3 Barriers to Entrepreneurship 
   Barriers to 
entrepreneurship 
Administrative 





Romania  0.5  0.7 0.1 0.6 
United 
Kingdom  0.8  0.7 1.2 0.4 
Canada  0.8  0.9 0.5 0.7 
Ireland  0.9  0.5 2.1 0.3 
Norway  1.0  1.0 1.2 0.6 
Sweden  1.1  1.2 1.1 0.6 
Finland  1.1  1.3 1.2 0.4 
Bulgaria  1.1  1.4 1.2 0.4 
Australia  1.1  1.0 1.2 1.5 
New  Zealand  1.2  0.8 2.2 0.4 
United  States  1.2  1.0 1.3 1.5 
Slovak 
Republic  1.2  1.9 0.7 0.3 
Luxembourg  1.2  1.8 1.1 0.1 
Denmark  1.2  0.5 2.1 1.7 
Portugal  1.3  1.7 1.2 0.5 
Brazil  1.3  1.5 1.4 0.6 
Albania  1.3  1.5 1.3 0.8 
Croatia  1.4  1.5 1.3 1.2 
Italy  1.4  2.4 0.4 0.6 
Japan  1.4  1.9 1.2 0.6 
Hungary  1.4  2.3 0.4 1.1 
Germany  1.6  1.6 2.2 0.5 
Iceland  1.6  1.4 2.4 0.7 
Greece  1.6  2.6 0.6 0.5 
Spain  1.6  2.8 0.4 0.4 
France  1.6  1.9 1.3 1.4 
Belgium  1.6  1.7 2.2 0.6 
Austria  1.6  2.8 0.4 0.8 
Netherlands  1.6  1.6 2.5 0.6 
Korea  1.7  2.2 1.2 1.0 
Switzerland  1.9  1.7 3.1 0.7 
Czech 
Republic  1.9  2.3 2.3 0.5 
Mexico  2.2  3.1 0.4 2.9 
Poland  2.3  3.7 1.5 0.3 
Turkey  2.5  2.7 3.4 0.5 
NOTE: The values of indicators refer to 2007 for Albania and Croatia, 2006 for Bulgaria and 
Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 for all other countries (Conway et al. 2005).   36
Table A1. 4: Barriers to trade and investment 
   Barriers to trade and 
investment  Explicit barriers  Other barriers 
Iceland  0.3 0.5 0.1 
Belgium  0.3 0.5 0.1 
Albania  0.4 0.5 0.2 
United 
Kingdom  0.4 0.5 0.2 
Ireland  0.5 0.8 0.2 
Finland  0.6 1.0 0.2 
Germany  0.6 0.6 0.7 
Netherlands  0.7 1.0 0.3 
Spain  0.7 0.7 0.6 
Austria  0.7 1.0 0.2 
Luxembourg  0.7 1.1 0.2 
United  States  0.7 1.1 0.2 
Norway  0.8 0.9 0.6 
Sweden  0.8 1.2 0.3 
Portugal  0.8 1.2 0.3 
Denmark  0.8 1.0 0.7 
New  Zealand  0.8 1.3 0.2 
Australia  0.9 1.4 0.2 
Czech  Republic  0.9 1.4 0.3 
Japan  0.9 1.4 0.3 
France  1.0 1.5 0.3 
Switzerland  1.0 1.5 0.4 
Canada  1.1 1.7 0.4 
Italy  1.1 1.7 0.4 
Greece  1.2 1.4 1.0 
Korea  1.3 1.9 0.4 
Bulgaria  1.3 2.0 0.4 
Romania  1.3 1.9 0.5 
Croatia  1.4 0.7 2.2 
Hungary  1.4 2.1 0.6 
Slovak  Republic  1.6 1.6 1.5 
Turkey  1.7 2.5 0.6 
Brazil  1.9 2.3 1.5 
Mexico  2.4 3.4 1.0 
Poland  2.4 3.0 1.7 
 
NOTE: The values of indicators refer to 2007 for Albania and Croatia, 2006 for Bulgaria and 
Romania,  2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 for all other countries (Conway et al. 2005).   37
Table A1. 5 State Control: values of the low-level indicators 
   Scope of public 
enterprise sector  
Size of public 








United  Kingdom  0.8 1.6 2.9 2.3 0.4 
Slovak  Republic  1.6 0.0 3.5 0.0 0.4 
Belgium  1.8 3.3 1.5 4.5 1.0 
Japan  2.0 0.0 0.6 3.0 2.5 
Korea 2.0 2.8 1.0 1.1 2.0 
Iceland  2.3 2.8 0.7 0.0 0.3 
New  Zealand  2.3 0.8 2.6 0.8 0.0 
Albania  2.5 4.8 0.5 3.8 0.3 
Denmark  2.5 2.3 0.8 1.4 0.0 
Ireland  2.5 2.6 0.8 3.8 0.8 
United  States  2.5 0.6 0.8 1.5 0.8 
Australia  2.8 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 
Canada  2.8 2.1 0.8 1.3 2.0 
Netherlands  2.8 2.8 2.0 1.7 0.3 
Brazil 2.9 0.0 3.0 4.2 1.3 
Romania  2.9 4.8 4.4 2.3 1.1 
Greece  3.0 3.8 0.9 5.1 2.3 
Mexico  3.0 3.6 0.9 1.7 1.0 
Germany  3.3 3.2 2.3 1.8 0.5 
Austria  3.5 4.0 0.0 2.2 1.3 
Finland  3.5 3.2 2.9 1.4 0.3 
Hungary  3.5 3.0 4.8 2.3 2.0 
Spain  3.5 2.5 2.3 4.4 0.8 
Luxembourg  3.5 1.2 2.9 1.5 0.0 
Sweden  3.7 2.7 0.7 2.3 1.0 
Bulgaria  3.7 3.5 3.3 3.8 1.4 
Czech  Republic  3.8 3.2 2.3 2.3 1.3 
Portugal  3.8 1.7 3.8 2.0 1.8 
Switzerland  3.8 0.9 2.6 1.2 2.6 
France  4.5 4.1 1.9 3.0 0.3 
Italy  4.5 3.7 3.5 1.9 2.0 
Croatia  4.6 3.8 4.2 3.5 0.8 
Norway  4.8 4.0 2.4 2.2 0.8 
Turkey  4.8 4.3 1.0 4.4 0.6 
Poland  5.8 4.6 3.0 3.5 1.6 
 
NOTE: The values of indicators refer to 2007 for Albania and Croatia, 2006 for Bulgaria and 
Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 for all other countries (Conway et al. 2005).   38





















Austria  0.0 0.5  3.0  3.4  0.3 1.0 
Canada  0.0 1.0  0.8  0.9  0.9 0.6 
Greece  0.0 1.1  2.3  2.9  1.6 0.0 
Hungary  0.0 0.5  2.3  2.0  1.6 0.9 
Italy  0.0 0.5  2.8  2.1  1.9 0.0 
Mexico  0.0 0.3  3.3  3.2  1.9 3.5 
Portugal  0.0 2.6  1.5  1.8  1.4 0.0 
Slovak 
Republic  0.0 1.4  2.0  1.9  0.6 0.0 
Spain 0.0 0.6  2.8  2.4  1.1 0.0 
Romania  0.0 0.1  0.8  0.8  2.0 0.0 
Australia  2.0 0.2  1.3  0.3  1.6 1.5 
Finland  2.0 0.3  1.3  1.1  1.4 0.0 
France  2.0 0.3  2.0  1.6  2.2 1.1 
Japan 2.0 0.3  1.5  2.3  1.4 0.3 
Korea 2.0 0.0  2.7  1.9  1.9 0.6 
Luxembourg  2.0 0.0  2.5  0.3  0.3 0.0 
Norway  2.0 0.2  1.0  0.9  2.2 0.0 
Poland  2.0 0.8  4.3  4.1  0.6 0.0 
Sweden  2.0 0.0  1.0  0.9  2.0 0.0 
United 
Kingdom  2.0 0.2  0.8  0.6  1.4 0.0 
United  States  2.0 0.4  0.8  1.0  1.4 1.6 
Brazil 2.0 0.6  0.5  1.3  2.0 0.0 
Bulgaria  2.0 0.3  1.4  1.9  1.1 0.0 
Croatia  2.0 0.5  1.3  1.1  1.4 1.1 
Albania  2.0 0.3  1.0  1.6  2.9 0.0 
Belgium  4.0 0.3  1.8  1.7  1.6 0.0 
Czech 
Republic  4.0 0.5  3.0  2.2  1.4 0.0 
Denmark  4.0 0.0  1.0  0.3  1.4 1.9 
Germany  4.0 0.3  2.3  1.4  1.4 0.0 
Iceland  4.0 0.7  1.3  1.6  2.3 0.0 
Ireland  4.0 0.2  0.8  0.3  0.9 0.0 
Netherlands  4.0 0.9  2.0  1.3  1.9 0.0 
New  Zealand  4.0 0.3  1.0  0.8  0.3 0.4 
Switzerland  6.0 0.0  2.3  0.8  2.2 0.0 
Turkey  6.0 0.5  2.3  3.2  1.4 0.0 
NOTE: The values of indicators refer to 2007 for Albania and Croatia, 2006 for Bulgaria and 
Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 for all other countries (Conway et al. 2005).   39
Table A1. 7 Barriers to Trade and Investment: values of the low-level indicators 





barriers   Tariffs  
Albania  0.0 0.7 0.0 1.0 
Belgium  0.3 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Germany  0.3 0.7 0.7 1.0 
United  Kingdom  0.3 0.3 0.0 1.0 
Croatia  0.5 0.7 2.9 1.0 
Romania  0.8 0.0 0.0 5.0 
Spain  0.8 0.3 0.7 1.0 
Iceland  1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Denmark  1.2 0.5 0.7 1.0 
Ireland  1.2 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Netherlands  1.2 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Greece  1.3 2.0 0.7 1.0 
Austria  1.5 0.3 0.0 1.0 
Finland  1.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Luxembourg  1.5 0.3 0.0 1.0 
Sweden  1.5 0.7 0.0 1.0 
Portugal  1.6 0.7 0.0 1.0 
United  States  1.8 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Norway  1.9 0.3 0.7 0.0 
Hungary  1.9 1.2 0.0 3.0 
Brazil  2.0 0.7 1.3 4.0 
Czech  Republic  2.0 0.7 0.0 1.0 
Switzerland  2.0 1.1 0.0 1.0 
Korea  2.2 0.0 0.0 3.0 
New  Zealand  2.3 0.0 0.0 1.0 
France  2.3 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Slovak  Republic  2.3 1.1 1.6 1.0 
Japan  2.4 0.3 0.0 1.0 
Australia  2.4 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Mexico  2.8 1.4 0.0 6.0 
Italy 2.8 0.7 0.0 1.0 
Canada  2.9 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Bulgaria  3.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 
Turkey  3.1 0.7 0.0 3.0 
Poland  3.7 0.3 1.6 4.0 
NOTE: The values of indicators refer to 2007 for Albania and Croatia, 2006 for Bulgaria and 
Romania, 2004 for Brazil, and to 2003 for all other countries (Conway et al. 2005). 
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Table A2. 1 
Scope of public enterprise sector 
 
Bulgaria Romania Croatia Albania OECD EU15 Slovak Republic Poland
ISIC         
(Rev. 3.1)    
code
Sector Yes No
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 1 6 0 y e s n on on on an a n o y e s
232 Manufacture of refined petroleum products 1 6 0 yes yes yes yes na na no yes
27 Manufacture of basic metals 1 6 0 y e s n on on on an a n o y e s
28, 29
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, machinery and 
equipment 
160
no no yes no na na no yes
4010
Electricity: electricity generation/import or electricity 
transmission or electricity distribution or electricity supply
160
yes yes yes yes na na yes yes
4020
Gas: gas production/import or gas transmission or gas 
distribution or gas supply
160
yes yes yes no na na yes yes
4100 Collection, purification and distribution of water  1 6 0 yes yes yes yes na na - yes
50, 51 Wholesale trade, incl. motor vehicles  1 6 0 no no no no na na no yes
55 Restaurant and hotels 1 6 0 no no yes no na na no yes
601, 6303
Railways: Passenger transport via railways, Freight transport 
via railways, operation of railroad infrastrucutre
160
yes yes yes yes na na no yes
6021 Other urban, suburban and interurban passenger transport  1 6 0 no yes yes yes na na yes yes
6021
Other scheduled passenger land transport
160
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. na na n.a. n.a.
6023 Freight transport by road 1 6 0 no no no no na na no yes
6303 Operation of road infrastructure  1 6 0 yes yes yes yes na na no no
61 Water transport 1 6 0 yes no yes no na na no yes
6303 Operation of water transport infrastructure 1 6 0 yes yes yes yes na na no yes
62 Air transport  1 6 0 yes yes yes no na na yes yes
6303 Operation of air transport infrastructure 1 6 0 yes yes yes no na na no yes
642
 Telecommunication fixed line services, mobile services, 
internet services. 
160
yes yes yes no na na yes yes
6519, 659, 
671
Financial institutions 1 6 0
no no yes no na na no yes
66, 672 Insurance 1 6 0 no no yes yes na na no yes
74 Other business activity 160 no no yes no na na no yes
851  Human health activities 851 1 6 0 yes no - - na na yes yes
9211, 9212 Motion picture distribution and projection 1 6 0 no no no yes na na no yes
60.87% 47.83% 77.27% 40.91% 52.41% 53.63% 27.27% 95.83%
3.65 2.87 4.64 2.45 3.14 3.22 5.75 1.64
Country score (0-6)
 if number of answers>=20 then 
iai answeri)/iai 
Do the national, state or provincial government hold equity stakes in the 




Scope of public enterprise sector 
percent of sectors with state 
ownership  41
Table A2. 2 Size of public enterprise sector 
 
 
*/ We assume full state ownership in 1993. Data for subsequent years were calculated relying on a perpetual inventory method type of approach: It= 
It-1 +0.2*(Pt-1), where the first It-1 is the original index (equal to zero for 1996) and Pt-1  is the privatization proceeds flow for the year.  We are 




as (pct of GDP)
Size of  public sector














2007e 0.72 3.75  42
Table A2. 3 Extent of direct control over business enterprise 
 
Yes No Bulgaria Romania Croatia Albania OECD EU15 Poland Slovakia
30% *wi                             
(% of business 
sectors in which 
the state controls at 
least a firm)
1 6 0 yes yes yes no 18/30 yes n.a. no yes
20% *wi                             
(% of business 
sectors in which 
the state controls at 
least a firm)
1 6 0 no yes yes yes 16/30 yes n.a. no no
50%  
1/2 6 0 yes yes yes no 11/30 yes n.a. yes yes
 
1 6 0 yes yes yes n.a 9/30 yes n.a. yes yes
1 6 0 no yes no n.a 23/30 no n.a. yes yes
1 6 0 no yes no n,a 25/30 no n.a. yes yes
160 y e s y e s n o n.a 6/30 yes n.a. yes yes
1/2 61% 48% 77% 41% 53% 56% 96% 27%
3.3 4.4 4.2 0.5 1.9 1.9 3.0 3.5
 iai answeri)/iai 
Country scores (0-6) i wi*bi*answeri 
These special rights can be exercised in change in controlling coalition
These special rights can be exercised in choice of management
These special rights can be exercised in strategic management decisions
Weight:% of business sector in which the state controls at least a firm (scope of public enterprise 
sector/6) )
Strategic choices of any publicly-controlled firms have to be reviewed and/or cleared in advance 
by national, state, or provincial legislatures
Golden shares
National, state or provincial governments have special voting rights (e.g. golden shares) in any 
firms within the business sector
These special rights can be exercised in merger with or acquisition by another company
Extent of the special rights
General constraints 
There are any legal or constitutional constraints to the sale of the stakes held by government in 
these firms
 Direct control over business enterprise
Weight          
wi
Weight       
bi
Weight    
ai
Coding of answers  43
Table A2. 4 Price Controls 
 





1/4 Score 2.40 2.40 0.00 0.00 1.23 0.54 0.75 5.40
1/2 0 no no no no na na no yes
1/2 0.8 0.8 0 0 na na 0.25 0.8
1/4 Score 0 0 0 0 0.87 1.00 0 0
1/3 0
no no no no na na no no
1/3 0 no no no no na na no no
1/3 0
- n on on on an a n o n o
1/4 S c o r e 32312 1 . 6 3 1 1
Yes or - Yes or - No
Yes No
1/6 6 0 0 yes yes yes no na na yes yes
1/6 6 0 0 - no yes no na na no no
1/6 6 0 0 y e s n on on on an a n o n o
1/6 6 0 0 no no no no na na no no
1/6 6 0 0 yes yes yes yes na na no yes
1/6 6 0 0 - yes yes - na na yes no
S c o r e 000000 0 0
1/4 1 0
no no no no na na no no
Overall score 1.35 1.10 0.75 0.25 1.01 0.83 1.60 0.44
6
6
Retail prices of  certain staples (e.g. milk and bread) are subject to price controls
6
Retail prices of road freight services are regulated in some way by the government
Government provides pricing guidelines to road freight companies 6
6
Retail prices of gasoline are subject to price controls
Retail prices of  tobacco are subject to price controls
Prices of domestic air fares are regulated
Relatif number of 5 or 4 busiest routes subject to price regulation 
Road freight
Retail prices of  alcohol are subject to price controls
Retail prices of pharmaceuticals are subject to price controls
Professional bodies or representatives of trade and commercial interests are involved 
in specifying or enforcing pricing guidelines or regulations
Retail distribution













Scale for Retail 
Retail prices of other product are subject to price controls
Telecommunication
Country scores (0-6)
Retail prices of digital mobile service in telecommunications are regulated  44
Table A2. 5. Use of command and control regulation  
 
Yes No
Bulgaria Romania Croatia Albania OECD EU15 Poland Slovak  Republic
1/2
1/2 0 6
no yes yes no n.a. n.a. yes yes
1/2 0 6




no no no no n.a. n.a. no no
1/8 6 0
no no no no n.a. n.a. no no
1/8 6 0
no no no no n.a. n.a. no no
1/8 6 0
no no no no n.a. n.a. no no
1/4 n.a. n.a.
2/3 6 0 no no yes no n.a. n.a. yes no
1/3 6 0
no - n.a. n.a.
*- 0 . 50
no - n.a. n.a.
1/4 n.a. n.a.
160
no no yes no n.a. n.a. yes no
1/4 n.a. n.a.
160
yes yes yes yes n.a. n.a. yes no













The regulation of opening hours became more 
flexible in the last 5 years
Air travel
Shop opening hours are regulated
Government regulations on shop opening hours 
apply at national level
(1)
Country scores (0-6) iai jbj kck answerijk
Carriers operating on domestic routes are subject to 
universal service requirements (e.g. obligation to 
serve specified customers or areas)
Railways
Companies operating the infrastructure or providing 
railway services are subject to universal service 
requirements (e.g. obligation to serve specified 
customers or areas)
Regulations prevent or constrain contract carriage   
(contractual relation between an otherwise 
independent haulier and one shipper)
Regulations prevent or constrain intermodal 
operations                                         (operating or 




Regulations prevent or constrain backhauling       
(picking up freight on the return leg)
Regulations prevent or constrain private carriage    
(transport only for own account)
Use of command and  control regulation
Regulators are required to assess alternative policy 
instruments (regulatory and non-regulatory) before 
adopting new regulation
Guidance has been issued on using alternatives to 
traditional regulation
Coding of answers
General information  45




Yes No Bulgaria Romania Croatia Albania OECD EU15 Poland Slovak Rep
1/3 0 6 no yes no yes n.a. n.a. no yes
1/3 0 6 yes yes yes yes n.a. n.a. yes yes
1/3 0 6 yes yes yes no n.a. n.a. yes yes
2022 2 . 2 220
Licenses and permits system
Coding of answers
Country scores (0-6)
The 'silence is consent' rule (i.e. that licenses are
issued automatically if the competent licensing office
has not acted by the end of the statutory response
period) is used at all
There are single contact points (“one-stop shops”)
for getting information on notifications and licenses
There are single contact points (“one-stop shops”)




(c k)  46
Table A2. 7 Communication and simplification of rules and procedures 
 
 
Bulgaria Romania Croatia Albania  OECD EU15 Poland Slovakia
1/2
2/12 6 - yes yes yes yes n.a. n.a. yes yes
1/12 6 - yes yes yes no n.a. n.a. yes yes



























1/3 yes no no no n.a. n.a. yes no
1/3 no yes yes yes n.a. n.a. yes yes
1/3 yes yes yes yes n.a. n.a. no no









National government (all ministries and agencies) keeps 
a complete count of the number of permits and licenses 
required 
There are systematic procedures for making regulations 
known and accessible to affected parties
There is a general policy requiring "plain language" 
drafting of regulation
There are inquiry points where affected or interested 
foreign parties can get information on the operation and 
enforcement of regulations
Affected parties have the right to appeal against 
adverse enforcement decisions in individual cases
Government policy imposes specific requirements in 
relation to transparency/freedom of information 
government wide
Country weight (0-1) 
Administrative burdens for corporation
Administrative burdens for sole proprietor firms 
Sector specific administrative burdens 
2/12
Communication
There is an explicit program to reduce the administrative 
burdens imposed by government on enterprises and/or 
citizens
There is a program underway to review and reduce the 
number of licenses and permits required by the national 
government
Simplification










1/2*(Wi-Min W)/(Max W98- Min W)







Table A2. 8 Administrative burden on sole proprietor firms 
 
 
0123456 Croatia Albania OECD EU-15 Poland Slovakia Republic Hungary
Number of mandatory procedures 
required to register a sole prioprietor 
firm (pre-registration+registration)
1/4 <=3 <=5 <=8 <=12 <=16 <=20 >20 16 10 8.6 7.3 7 12 7 9
Number of public and private bodies to 
contact to register a sole proprietor 
firm(pre-registration+registration)
1 / 4 0123456 2 . 5 2 3 . 4 3 . 5 5736
Number of working days required to 
complete all mandatory procedures for 
registering a sole proprietor firm (pre-
registration+registration)
1/4 <=16.4 <=32.8 <=49.2 <=65.6 <=82 <=98.4 >98.4 8 9.5 12.3 8.7 7 24 30 19
Total cost (euros) of registering a sole 
proprietor (pre-registration+registration) 
1/4 <=500 <=1000 <=1500 <=2500 <=5000 <=7500 >7500 90.8 0.82 227.8 283.4 248 1572 32.967033 473.35411
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Table A2. 9 Administrative burden on corporations 
 
 
NOTE: Values for Bulgaria and Romania were obtained based on Doing Business 2005 data. Since Doing Business information on number of 
procedures, number of days and cost connected with starting a company are not directly comparable to the same information in the OECD 
International Regulation Database, a normalization process was necessary to homogenize the scores obtained. The normalization process proceeded 
as follows.  
1) A standard score (also called z-score or normal score) was obtained as Z = (raw score - meanOECD-DB)/standard deviationOECD-DB based on 
the Doing Business sample, where the values for OECD countries refer to Doing Business 2003. The z-score reveals how many units of the OECD 
standard deviation Croatia and Romania are above or below the OECD mean. 
2) A transformed score, comparable to OECD scores obtained from the OECD International Regulation Database, is calculated for Croatia and 
Romania as T = Z*(standard deviation OECD-PMR) + mean OECD-PMR 
 
01234 5 6
Bulgaria Romania Croatia Albania OECD EU15 Poland Slovak Republic
Number of mandatory procedures required to register 
a public limited company (pre-
registration+registration)
1/4 <=3 <=5 <=8 <=12 <=16 <=20 >20
11 5 21 15 14.9 14.5 28 15
Number of public and private bodies to contact to 
register a public limited company (pre-
registration+registration)
1/4 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
--2 2 5 . 0 5 . 1 6 8
Number of working days required to complete all 
mandatory procedures for registering a public limited 
company (pre-registration+registration)
1/4 <=16.4 <=32.8 <=49.2 <=65.6 <=82 <=98.4 >98.4
32 11 6 12 23.8 22.3 90 15
Total cost (euros) of registering a public limited 
company (pre-registration+registration) 
1/4 <=500 <=1000 <=1500 <=2500 <=5000 <=7500 >7500
180.33 107.54 455.5 247.82 1108.14 283.40 n.a 721.97
Country scores (0-6) 1.37 0.80 1.25 1.00 1.90 1.83 4.33 2.00 kck answerk
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Yes No - no no - - na na yes No
4321 0 -
1/3 yes no yes - na na yes yes
1/3 no yes no yes na na no no



























































size of outlet 













size of outlet 





























na na always required
depends on 
size of outlet
1.88 0.75 1.05 1.55 1.67 1.56 4.11 1.91
Notification to authorities is needed to start up a 
commercial activity for selling food products 
Country scores (0-6)
Notification to authorities is needed to start up a 
commercial activity for selling clothing products 
Licenses or permits are needed to engage in 








Registration in commercial register is needed to start 
up a commercial activity for selling clothing products 
10
In order to establish a national road freight business, 
operators need to obtain a license (other than a 
driving license) or permit from the government or a 
regulatory agency
There are criteria other than technical and financial 
fitness and compliance with public safety 
requirements considered in decisions on entry of 
new operators
These entry regulations apply also if a firm wants to 
transport only for its own account
Registration in commercial register is needed to start 
up a commercial activity for seeling food products 









startups       w=wi 
/ Max w98
Licenses or permits are needed to engage in 
commercial acitivity (not related to outlet siting)  for 
selling clothing products
 Licenses or permits are needed for outlet siting (in 
addition to compliance with general urban planning 
provisions) for selling food products
 Licenses or permits are needed for outlet siting (in 
addition to compliance with general urban planning 
provisions) for selling clothing products
Road freight
Retail distribution
Sector specific administrative burdens
10
Coding of answers
In order to establish a national road freight business, 
operators need to notify any level of government or a 
regulatory agency and wait for approval before they 
can start operation
Registration in transport register is required in order 
to establish a new business in the road freight sector
In order to operate a national road freight business, 





















"depends on type of  "no requirement"     50
Table A2. 11. Legal barriers to entry 
 
 
Electricity: Yes if national, state or provincial government controls at least one firm in one of the four following sectors: electricity generation/import 
or electricity transmission or electricity supply 
Gas: Yes if national, state or provincial government controls at least one firm in one of the four following sectors: gas production/import or gas 
transmission or gas supply 
Railways: Yes if national, state or provincial government controls at least one firm in one of the three following sectors: Passenger transport via 
railways, Freight transport via railways, Operation of railroad infrastructure 
Telecommunication: Yes if national, state or provincial government controls at least one firm in one of the four following sectors: fixed-line network, 
fixed-line services, mobile services, internet services. 
ISIC      
(rev. 3.1)  
code
Sector Yes No Bulgaria Romania Croatia Albania OECD EU15 Poland Slovak Rep.
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 1 6 0 - no no no n.a. n.a. no no
232 Manufacture of refined petroleum products 1 6 0 no no no yes n.a. n.a. no no
27 Manufacture of basic metals 1 6 0 no no no no n.a. n.a. no no
28, 29 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment  1 6 0 no no no no n.a. n.a. no no
4010
Electricity: electricity generation/import or electricity transmission or electricity 
supply
1 6 0 yes yes yes yes n.a. n.a. yes yes
4020 Gas: gas production/import or gas transmission or gas supply 160 yes yes yes yes n.a. n.a. yes yes
4100 Collection, purification and distribution of water  1 6 0 yes no yes yes n.a. n.a. no -
50, 51 Wholesale trade, incl. motor vehicles  1 6 0 no no no no n.a. n.a. no no
55 Restaurant and hotels 1 6 0 no no no no n.a. n.a. no no
601, 6303
Railways: Passenger transport via railways, Freight transport via railways, 
Operation of railroad infrastrucutre
1 6 0 no yes yes no n.a. n.a. no no
6021 Other urban, suburban and interurban passenger transport  1 6 0 - no no no n.a. n.a. no no
6021 Other scheduled passenger land transport 1 6 0 no - - - n.a. n.a. - -
6023 Freight transport by r o a d 1 6 0 n on on on o n . a . n . a . n on o
6303 Operation of road infrastructure  1 6 0 no yes no yes n.a. n.a. no no
61 Water transport 1 6 0 no no no no n.a. n.a. no no
6303 Operation of water transport infrastructure 1 6 0 no no no yes n.a. n.a. no no
62 Air transport  1 6 0 no no no no n.a. n.a. no no
6303 Operation of air transport infrastructure 1 6 0 yes yes no yes n.a. n.a. no no
642
 Telecommunication: fixed-line network, fixed-line services, mobile services, 
internet services
1 6 0 no yes yes yes n.a. n.a. no no
6519, 659, 
671
Financial institutions 1 6 0 no no no yes n.a. n.a. no no
66, 672 Insurance 1 6 0 no no no yes n.a. n.a. no no
74 Other business activity 160n oyes no no n.a. n.a. no no
851  Human health activities  1 6 0 - - - - n.a. n.a. - -
9211, 
9212
Motion picture distribution and projection 1 6 0 no no no no n.a. n.a. no no
19% 33% 24% 48% 5% 23% 10% 10%
1.1 2.0 1.4 2.9 1.4 1.4 0.6 0.6
proportion of sectors with legal 
barriers to entry
Country scores (0-6)
 if number of answers>=20 then 
iai answeri)/iai 
Legal barriers to entry 
National, state or provincial laws or other regulations restrict the number of 
competitors allowed to operate a business in at least some markets in:
Weight (ai)
Coding of answers  51





Bulgaria Romania Croatia Albania  OECD EU15 Poland Slovakia
Is there rule or principle providing for exclusion or exemption 
from liability under the general competition law for conduct that 
is required or authorized by other government authority (in 
addition to exclusions that might apply to complete sectors)?
1/4 6 0
no no yes no n.a. n.a. no no
Publicly-controlled firms or undertakings are subject to an 




























Publicly-controlled firms or undertakings are subject to an 
exclusion or exemption from competition law such as vertical 



























Publicly-controlled firms or undertakings are subject to an 



























Country scores (0-6) 00 1 . 1 0 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.0
Coding of answers
Weight                =wi  
= (Scope + Size 
of public sector 
enterprises)/2) 
wikck answerk / wi
max   
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Table A2. 9.  Foreign ownership barriers 
 
Bulgaria Romania Croatia Albania  OECD EU15 Poland Slovak  Rep.
2/3*wi (% of 
business sectors 
in which the state 
controls at least a 
firm)
y e s n on on o n . a . n . a . y e s y e s






n.a. n.a. yes yes
Yes
6 none none none none n.a. n.a. none none
<50% <40% <35% <30% <25%




concecpt of the 
ownership and 
control could be 
applicable
3.0 1.8 0.5 0.0 1.8 1.3 3.7 2.3
Memo item
61% 48% 77% 41% n.a. n.a. 96% 27%
Memo item:  % of business sectors in which the state controls 
at least a firm
Country scores (0-6)
Sector-specific barriers





There are statutory or other legal 
limits to the number or proportion of 
shares that can be acquired by 
foreign investors in publicly-controlled 
firms
Special government rights can be 
exercised in the case of acquisition of 
equity by foreign investors
jbj kck answerjk














Foreign ownership barriers 
Coding of answers
Yes No  53




Bulgaria Romania Croatia Albania OECD EU15 Poland Slovak Rep.
General discrimination 2/3
3/6 yes yes yes yes n.a. n.a. yes yes
2/6 yes yes yes yes n.a. n.a. yes yes
1/6 yes yes no no n.a. n.a. no yes
Competition discrimination 1/3
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No/- Yes Yes Yes No/- Yes No/- No/- No/- No/- No/- yes yes yes yes n.a. n.a. yes yes
Yes Yes No/- No/- Yes Yes No/- Yes No/- Yes No/- No/- Yes No/- Yes No/- yes yes yes yes n.a. n.a. yes no
Yes No/- Yes No/- Yes Yes Yes No/- Yes No/- No/- No/- No/- Yes Yes No/- yes yes yes yes n.a. n.a. yes yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes No/- Yes No/- No/- Yes Yes No/- Yes No/- No/- No/- No/- yes yes yes yes n.a. n.a. yes yes
0 0.75 0.75 1.5 2.625 2.625 3.375 3.375 3.375 3.375 4.125 4.125 5.25 5.25 5.25 6
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.49 0.25 1.13 jbj kck answerjk
When business practices are perceived to restrict 
competition and hence prevent effective access of 
foreign firms (foreign owned or controlled) to such 
markets, foreign firms can have redress through 
regulatory authorities involved 
Country scores (0-6)
When business practices are perceived to restrict 
competition foreign firms can have redress through 






When appeal procedures relating to regulatory 
decisions are available in domestic regulatory 
systems, they are open to affected or interested 
foreign parties as well
There are specific provisions which require that 
regulations, prior to entry into force, be published or 
otherwise communicated to the public in a manner 
accessible at the international level
When business practices are perceived to restrict 




0-6 Scale for competition discrimination
When business practices are perceived to restrict 




Country has any specific provisions which require or 
encourage explicit recognition of the national 
treatment principle when applying regulations, so as 
to guarantee non-discrimination between foreign and 




by theme   54












Bulgaria Romania Croatia Albania OECD EU15 Poland Slovak Republic
Average production-weighted tariff <=3% <=6% <=9% <=12% <=15% <=18% >18% 8.6 15.8 4.9 5.7 5.5 7.4 13.4 5.1
Country scores (0-6) 0123456 2 . 0 5 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 4 1 . 0 4 . 0 1 . 0
Coding of answers
Tariffs trade barriers





The country has engaged in Mutual Recognition 
Agreements (MRAs) in at least a sector with any other 
country
2/5 0 6 yes yes yes yes na na yes yes
There are specific provisions which require or 
encourage regulators to consider recognizing the 
equivalence of regulatory measures or the result of 
conformity assessment performed in other countries, 
wherever possible and appropriate
4/15 0 6 yes yes no y e s n a n an on o
There are specific provisions which require or 
encourage regulators to use internationally harmonized 
standards and certification procedures wherever 
possible and appropriate
2/9 0 6 yes yes no yes na na yes yes
There are any specific provisions which require or 
encourage regulatory administrative procedures to 
avoid unnecessary trade restrictiveness
1/9 0 6 yes yes yes yes na na yes yes
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Annex II: The OECD ETCR Indicators (from Conway and Nicoletti, 
2006) 
 
The OECD indicators of regulation in energy, transport and communication (ETCR) are 
calculated using a bottom-up approach in which the regulatory data are quantified using an 
appropriate scoring algorithm and then aggregated into summary indicators by sector of activity 
in each of the four areas or across them. While this approach involves a degree of discretion, 
notably in choosing scores and aggregation weights, it has the merit of transparency and makes it 
possible to trace each indicator value to the underlying detailed information about policies and 
market conditions. 
 
All of these indicators are constructed from the perspective of regulations that create barriers to 
entrepreneurship and restrict competition in domestic markets where technology and demand 
conditions make competition viable. It is important to note from the onset that the sole objective 
of the indicators is to quantify the degree to which regulatory settings in a given sector are anti-
competitive. They make no attempt to measure the stance of regulation with respect to public 
policy goals other than promoting competition. Including public ownership among regulations 
that hinder competition in some sectors reflects the idea that, with public enterprises often 
enjoying soft budget constraints and state guarantees, the playing field is not level in markets 
where they operate. 
 
Given the sectoral focus of the indicators, the coverage of the various regulatory areas – such as 
public ownership, barriers to entry or price controls – is tailored to the structural characteristics of 
each industry. In addition, the indicators are nested, aggregating detailed information into 
progressively larger regulatory areas according to a pyramidal structure (see Figure). This allows 
specific aspects of regulation – such as barriers to entry – to be assessed in isolation in country 
benchmarking or empirical research.  
 
In general, the computation of sectoral indicators involved three main steps: 
 
  First, the basic information is coded into quantitative scores that are increasing in 
restrictions to competition. 
  Second, these basic scores are aggregated into indices that cover specific areas of 
regulation (henceforth low-level indicators). In all sectors, these low-level indicators 
cover barriers to entry, i.e. regulations that curb entry and/or distort market structure 
relative to a competitive outcome (for instance limiting the number of competitors in a 
given market or the proportion of consumers who can choose between competing 
suppliers). 
  In the third step, the low-level indicators are aggregated into an overall indicator of 
regulation for the sector. 
 
The way in which the basic scores and/or the low-level indicators are aggregated differs across 
sectors depending on how many regulatory data are available One potential difficulty with 
measuring the impact of regulation on competition is accounting for the influence of enforcement. 
Stringent regulations may not bite on competition if not enforced, and even the most liberal 
regulatory settings may not promote competition if not implemented correctly. Similarly, in some 
cases, regulations enacted at the national level may have little impact on markets if applied by 
local authorities (as gas sector in Croatia) or if local legislation is contradictory in spirit. To go 
some way towards overcoming this difficulty, data on actual market and industry structure (such 
as market shares or the degree of vertical integration) are incorporated into some of the sectoral   56
indicators so as to proxy for the impact of policy enforcement. However, the indicator results may 
still incur some bias in countries with a federal structure, when regulatory policies are controlled 
by the sub-central levels of government.5 Moreover, as already mentioned, barriers to 
competition may not be fully captured by the indicators when they are mostly informal. 
 
The non-manufacturing regulation (henceforth NMR) indicators can be divided into two broad 
categories. The first group of indicators measure regulatory restrictions in energy, transport and 
communication (henceforth ETCR). The second group of indicators assess regulation in retail 
distribution and some business services (henceforth RBSR), which are already covered in the 
companion OECD PMR indicator. 
 
Table: Coverage of ETCR and RBSR indicators 
 
Source: Conway and Nicoletti (2006) 
  
 
Figure: The ETCR indicator system 
 
Source: Conway and Nicoletti (2006)   57
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Aggregate ETCR 




1975  na  5.4 5.1 
1976  na  5.4 5.1 
1977  na  5.4 5.1 
1978  na  5.4 5.1 
1979  na  5.4 5.1 
1980  na  5.4 5.1 
1981  na  5.4 5.1 
1982  na  5.4 5.1 
1983  na  5.4 5.0 
1984  na  5.4 5.0 
1985  na  5.3 5.0 
1986  na  5.3 4.9 
1987  na  5.2 4.8 
1988  na  5.1 4.6 
1989  na  5.0 4.5 
1990  na  4.9 4.4 
1991 5.2  4.8  4.3 
1992 5.1  4.6  4.2 
1993 5.1  4.3  3.9 
1994 5.1  4.2  3.8 
1995 5.1  3.9  3.6 
1996 5.1  3.8  3.4 
1997 5.1  3.6  3.3 
1998 5.1  3.5  3.2 
1999 5.0  3.1  2.8 
2000 5.0  2.9  2.6 
2001 4.9  2.7  2.5 
2002 4.6  2.4  2.3 
2003 3.9  2.3  2.2 
2004 3.7  na  na
2005 3.8  na  na
2006 3.5  na  na
2007 3.4  na  na
2008 3.3  na  na
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Airlines 




1975 na  5.8  5.4 
1976  na  5.8 5.4 
1977  na  5.8 5.4 
1978  na  5.8 5.4 
1979  na  5.8 5.3 
1980  na  5.8 5.3 
1981  na  5.8 5.3 
1982  na  5.8 5.3 
1983  na  5.8 5.2 
1984  na  5.8 5.2 
1985  na  5.7 5.2 
1986  na  5.7 5.2 
1987  na  5.6 5.0 
1988  na  5.6 4.8 
1989  na  5.4 4.6 
1990  na  5.3 4.5 
1991 5.8  5.2  4.4 
1992 5.8  4.8  4.0 
1993 5.8  3.4  3.0 
1994 5.8  3.2  2.8 
1995 5.8  2.6  2.3 
1996 5.8  2.5  2.1 
1997 5.8  2.4  2.0 
1998 5.8  2.4  2.5 
1999 5.8  2.1  1.7 
2000 5.8  2.0  1.6 
2001 5.8  1.8  1.4 
2002 5.8  1.6  1.4 
2003 5.8  1.6  1.9 
2004 5.8  na  na
2005 5.8  na  na
2006 4.5  na  na
2007 4.5  na  na
2008 4.5  na  na
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Airlines 
year 
Entry Barriers  Public Ownership 
Croatia  EU-15 
average 
OECD 




1975 na 5.9  5.9  na  5.7  4.9 
1976 na 5.9  5.9  na  5.7  4.9 
1977 na 5.9  5.9  na  5.7  4.9 
1978 na 5.9  5.9  na  5.7  4.9 
1979 na 5.9  5.9  na  5.7  4.8 
1980 na 5.9  5.8  na  5.7  4.8 
1981 na 5.9  5.8  na  5.7  4.8 
1982 na 5.9  5.7  na  5.6  4.8 
1983 na 5.9  5.7  na  5.6  4.8 
1984 na 5.9  5.7  na  5.6  4.8 
1985 na 5.9  5.7  na  5.6  4.8 
1986 na 5.9  5.6  na  5.6  4.8 
1987 na 5.9  5.5  na  5.4  4.6 
1988 na 5.9  5.4  na  5.3  4.2 
1989 na 5.9  5.4  na  5.0  3.8 
1990 na 5.7  5.3  na  4.9  3.8 
1991 6.0 5.6  5.2  5.6  4.9  3.7 
1992 6.0 5.4  5.0  5.6  4.3  3.1 
1993 6.0 2.5  3.2  5.6  4.2  3.0 
1994 6.0 2.3  3.1  5.6  4.0  2.8 
1995 6.0 1.4  2.2  5.6  3.8  2.8 
1996 6.0 1.2  1.8  5.6  3.7  2.7 
1997 6.0 1.2  1.6  5.6  3.7  2.6 
1998 6.0 1.2  2.2  5.6  3.7  2.8 
1999 6.0 1.1  1.3  5.6  3.1  2.2 
2000 6.0 1.1  1.2  5.6  2.9  2.0 
2001 6.0 1.0  1.2  5.6  2.6  1.9 
2002 6.0 0.8  1.0  5.6  2.5  2.0 
2003 6.0 0.7  1.4  5.6  2.3  2.5 
2004 6.0 na  na  5.6  na  na 
2005 6.0 na  na  5.6  na  na 
2006 3.3 na  na  5.6  na  na 
2007 3.3 na  na  5.6  na  na 
2008 3.3 na  na  5.6  na  na 
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Telecom 




1975 na  5.9  5.7 
1976 na  5.9  5.7 
1977 na  5.9  5.7 
1978 na  5.9  5.7 
1979 na  5.9  5.7 
1980 na  5.9  5.7 
1981 na  5.9  5.7 
1982 na  5.9  5.6 
1983 na  5.9  5.6 
1984 na  5.8  5.6 
1985 na  5.8  5.5 
1986 na  5.8  5.5 
1987 na  5.8  5.4 
1988 na  5.8  5.3 
1989 na  5.8  5.3 
1990 na  5.8  5.3 
1991 6.0  5.4  4.9 
1992 6.0  5.4  4.8 
1993 6.0  5.2  4.7 
1994 6.0  5.0  4.6 
1995 6.0  4.6  4.3 
1996 6.0  4.3  4.1 
1997 6.0  3.8  3.6 
1998 5.6  3.3  3.1 
1999 5.2  2.3  2.3 
2000 5.2  1.8  2.1 
2001 4.6  1.7  1.9 
2002 4.6  1.5  1.7 
2003 4.0  1.4  1.6 
2004 3.0  na  na 
2005 2.7  na  na 
2006 2.6  na  na 
2007 2.6  na  na 






























5  na 6.0 5.8 na 5.7 5.4 na 6.0 6.0 
197
6  na 6.0 5.8 na 5.7 5.4 na 6.0 6.0 
197
7  na 6.0 5.8 na 5.7 5.4 na 6.0 6.0 
197
8  na 6.0 5.8 na 5.7 5.4 na 6.0 6.0 
197
9  na 6.0 5.8 na 5.7 5.4 na 6.0 6.0 
198
0  na 6.0 5.8 na 5.7 5.4 na 6.0 6.0 
198
1  na 6.0 5.8 na 5.7 5.4 na 6.0 6.0 
198
2  na 5.8 5.6 na 5.7 5.4 na 6.0 6.0 
198
3  na 5.8 5.6 na 5.7 5.4 na 6.0 5.9 
198
4  na 5.8 5.6 na 5.5 5.3 na 6.0 5.9 
198
5  na 5.8 5.4 na 5.5 5.3 na 6.0 5.9 
198
6  na 5.8 5.4 na 5.5 5.3 na 6.0 5.9 
198
7  na 5.8 5.3 na 5.5 5.2 na 6.0 5.9 
198
8  na 5.8 5.0 na 5.5 5.2 na 6.0 5.9 
198
9  na 5.8 4.9 na 5.5 5.2 na 6.0 5.8 
199
0  na 5.8 4.9 na 5.5 5.1 na 5.9 5.8 
199
1  6.0 5.0 4.3 6.0 5.2 4.7 6.0 5.9 5.7 
199
2  6.0 5.0 4.3 6.0 5.2 4.5 6.0 5.9 5.6 
199
3  6.0 5.0 4.2 6.0 4.9 4.6 6.0 5.8 5.5 
199
4  6.0 4.6 4.0 6.0 4.8 4.5 6.0 5.5 5.2 
199
5  6.0 4.0 3.6 6.0 4.4 4.2 6.0 5.3 5.1 
199
6  6.0 3.6 3.5 6.0 4.1 4.0 6.0 5.1 4.9 
199
7  6.0 3.2 3.0 6.0 3.2 3.2 6.0 4.9 4.6 
199 4.7 2.5 2.3 6.0 3.2 3.2 6.0 4.5 4.4   69
8 
199
9  4.7 0.6 1.0 4.8 2.7 2.8 6.0 3.8 3.8 
200
0  4.7 0.3 0.6 4.8 2.2 2.4 6.0 3.4 3.5 
200
1  4.7 0.3 0.6 2.9 2.1 2.2 6.0 3.0 3.2 
200
2  4.7 0.1 0.2 2.9 2.0 2.1 6.0 2.9 3.1 
200
3  4.4 0.0 0.1 2.9 1.7 2.0 4.7 2.9 3.0 
200
4  1.3 na  na 2.9 na  na 4.7 na  na 
200
5  1.3 na  na 2.5 na  na 4.4 na  na 
200
6  1.3 na  na 2.5 na  na 3.9 na  na 
200
7  1.3 na  na 2.5 na  na 3.9 na  na 
200
8  1.3 na  na 0.6 na  na 3.9 na  na 
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Electricity 




1975 na  5.5  5.3 
1976 na  5.5  5.3 
1977 na  5.5  5.3 
1978 na  5.5  5.3 
1979 na  5.5  5.3 
1980 na  5.4  5.3 
1981 na  5.4  5.3 
1982 na  5.4  5.3 
1983 na  5.4  5.3 
1984 na  5.4  5.3 
1985 na  5.4  5.3 
1986 na  5.4  5.3 
1987 na  5.4  5.3 
1988 na  5.4  5.3 
1989 na  5.4  5.2 
1990 na  5.0  5.0 
1991 6.0  5.0  4.8 
1992 5.7  4.8  4.7 
1993 5.7  4.8  4.6 
1994 5.7  4.7  4.4 
1995 5.7  4.5  4.3 
1996 5.7  4.3  4.1 
1997 5.7  4.2  4.0 
1998 5.7  4.0  3.8 
1999 5.7  3.2  3.1 
2000 5.7  2.6  2.7 
2001 5.7  2.1  2.2 
2002 4.3  1.6  1.9 
2003 2.1  1.6  1.9 
2004 2.1  na  na 
2005 2.1  na  na 
2006 2.1  na  na 
2007 2.0  na  na 
2008 2.0  na  na 
   71
Electricity 
year 
Entry Public  Ownership  Vertical Integration 
Croatia  EU-15 
average 
OECD 
average  Croatia  EU-15 
average 
OECD 




1975 na  5.9  6.0 na 4.8 4.4 na 5.7 5.6
1976 na  5.9  6.0 na 4.8 4.4 na 5.7 5.6
1977 na  5.9  6.0 na 4.8 4.4 na 5.7 5.6
1978 na  5.9  6.0 na 4.8 4.4 na 5.7 5.6
1979 na  5.9  6.0 na 4.8 4.4 na 5.7 5.6
1980 na  5.9  6.0 na 4.7 4.4 na 5.7 5.7
1981 na  5.9  6.0 na 4.7 4.4 na 5.7 5.7
1982 na  5.9  6.0 na 4.7 4.4 na 5.7 5.7
1983 na  5.9  6.0 na 4.7 4.4 na 5.7 5.7
1984 na  5.9  6.0 na 4.7 4.4 na 5.7 5.7
1985 na  5.9  6.0 na 4.7 4.4 na 5.7 5.7
1986 na  5.9  6.0 na 4.7 4.4 na 5.7 5.7
1987 na  5.9  6.0 na 4.7 4.4 na 5.6 5.6
1988 na  5.9  6.0 na 4.7 4.4 na 5.6 5.5
1989 na  5.9  6.0 na 4.6 4.3 na 5.6 5.5
1990 na  5.5  5.7 na 4.3 4.1 na 5.1 5.2
1991 6.0  5.4  5.3 6.0 4.3 4.1 6.0 5.1 5.1
1992 5.0  5.4  5.2 6.0 4.3 4.0 6.0 4.8 4.9
1993 5.0  5.4  5.2 6.0 4.3 4.0 6.0 4.7 4.6
1994 5.0  5.3  5.0 6.0 4.3 3.9 6.0 4.4 4.3
1995 5.0  5.1  4.9 6.0 4.2 3.9 6.0 4.3 4.2
1996 5.0  4.4  4.3 6.0 4.2 3.9 6.0 4.3 4.1
1997 5.0  4.3  4.2 6.0 4.1 3.8 6.0 4.1 3.9
1998 5.0  4.0  3.7 6.0 4.1 3.8 6.0 4.0 3.9
1999 5.0  2.6  2.5 6.0 3.6 3.3 6.0 3.4 3.5
2000 5.0  1.8  1.9 6.0 3.0 2.9 6.0 3.0 3.2
2001 5.0  1.3  1.5 6.0 3.0 2.9 6.0 1.9 2.4
2002 4.0  0.9  1.0 6.0 3.0 2.9 3.0 1.3 2.0
2003 0.3  0.8  1.0 6.0 2.8 3.3 0.0 1.3 2.0
2004 0.3  na  na 6.0 na na 0.0 na na
2005 0.3  na  na 6.0 na na 0.0 na na
2006 0.3  na  na 6.0 na na 0.0 na na
2007 0.0  na  na 6.0 na na 0.0 na na
2008 0.0  na  na 6.0 na na 0.0 na na
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Gas 




1975 na  4.8  4.5 
1976 na  4.8  4.5 
1977 na  4.8  4.5 
1978 na  4.8  4.5 
1979 na  4.8  4.5 
1980 na  4.8  4.5 
1981 na  4.8  4.5 
1982 na  4.8  4.5 
1983 na  4.8  4.5 
1984 na  4.8  4.5 
1985 na  4.8  4.5 
1986 na  4.7  4.4 
1987 na  4.7  4.4 
1988 na  4.7  4.4 
1989 na  4.7  4.4 
1990 na  4.7  4.3 
1991 6.0  4.7  4.3 
1992 6.0  4.7  4.3 
1993 6.0  4.6  4.3 
1994 6.0  4.6  4.3 
1995 6.0  4.5  4.1 
1996 6.0  4.5  4.1 
1997 6.0  4.4  4.1 
1998 6.0  4.3  4.0 
1999 6.0  4.2  4.0 
2000 6.0  4.0  3.8 
2001 5.6  3.7  3.6 
2002 5.4  3.5  3.3 
2003 4.5  3.2  3.2 
2004 4.5  na  na 
2005 4.5  na  na 
2006 4.5  na  na 
2007 4.1  na  na 
2008 4.1  na  na 
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Gas 
year 
Entry Public  Ownership  Market  structure Vertical  Integration 
Croatia  EU-15 
average 
OECD 
average  Croatia  EU-15 
average 
OECD 
average  Croatia  EU-15 
average 
OECD 




1975 na  5.2  5.2  na 3.9 3.5 na 5.0 4.4 na 5.1 4.7
1976 na  5.2  5.2  na 3.9 3.5 na 5.0 4.4 na 5.1 4.7
1977 na  5.2  5.2  na 3.9 3.5 na 5.0 4.4 na 5.1 4.7
1978 na  5.2  5.2  na 3.9 3.5 na 5.0 4.4 na 5.1 4.7
1979 na  5.2  5.2  na 3.9 3.5 na 5.0 4.4 na 5.1 4.7
1980 na  5.2  5.2  na 3.9 3.5 na 5.0 4.4 na 5.1 4.7
1981 na  5.2  5.2  na 3.9 3.5 na 5.0 4.4 na 5.1 4.7
1982 na  5.2  5.2  na 3.9 3.5 na 5.0 4.4 na 5.1 4.7
1983 na  5.2  5.2  na 3.9 3.5 na 5.0 4.4 na 5.1 4.7
1984 na  5.2  5.2  na 3.9 3.5 na 5.0 4.4 na 5.1 4.7
1985 na  5.2  5.1  na 3.9 3.5 na 5.0 4.4 na 5.1 4.7
1986 na  5.2  5.1  na 3.5 3.3 na 5.0 4.4 na 5.1 4.7
1987 na  5.2  5.1  na 3.5 3.3 na 5.0 4.4 na 5.1 4.7
1988 na  5.0  5.0  na 3.5 3.3 na 5.0 4.4 na 5.1 4.7
1989 na  5.0  5.0  na 3.5 3.3 na 5.0 4.4 na 5.1 4.7
1990 na  5.0  4.9  na 3.5 3.3 na 5.0 4.4 na 5.1 4.7
1991 6.0  5.0  4.9  6.0 3.5 3.3 6.0 5.0 4.4 6.0 5.1 4.7
1992 6.0  5.0  4.9  6.0 3.5 3.3 6.0 5.0 4.4 6.0 5.1 4.7
1993 6.0  4.9  4.8  6.0 3.5 3.3 6.0 5.0 4.4 6.0 5.1 4.7
1994 6.0  4.8  4.7  6.0 3.5 3.3 6.0 5.0 4.4 6.0 5.1 4.7
1995 6.0  4.6  4.6  6.0 3.1 3.0 6.0 5.0 4.4 6.0 5.1 4.6
1996 6.0  4.6  4.5  6.0 3.1 3.0 6.0 5.0 4.4 6.0 5.1 4.6
1997 6.0  4.6  4.5  6.0 3.1 3.0 6.0 5.0 4.4 6.0 5.0 4.6
1998 6.0  4.3  4.3  6.0 3.1 3.0 6.0 4.9 4.3 6.0 4.8 4.5
1999 6.0  4.0  4.1  6.0 3.1 3.0 6.0 4.9 4.3 6.0 4.8 4.5
2000 6.0  3.5  3.7  6.0 2.9 2.8 6.0 4.9 4.3 6.0 4.6 4.4
2001 6.0  3.0  3.4  6.0 2.9 2.8 6.0 4.9 4.3 4.5 4.0 4.0
2002 5.0  2.3  2.7  6.0 2.9 2.7 6.0 4.7 4.1 4.5 4.0 3.8
2003 4.0  1.8  2.4  5.0 2.8 2.5 6.0 4.5 4.0 3.0 3.5 3.5
2004 4.0  na  na  5.0 na na 6.0 na na 3.0 na na
2005 4.0  na  na  5.0 na na 6.0 na na 3.0 na na
2006 4.2  na  na  5.0 na na 6.0 na na 3.0 na na
2007 3.2  na  na  5.0 na na 6.0 na na 2.1 na na
2008 3.2  na  na  5.0 na na 6.0 na na 2.1 na na  74
Post 




1975 na  4.8  4.6 
1976 na  4.8  4.6 
1977 na  4.8  4.6 
1978 na  4.8  4.6 
1979 na  4.8  4.6 
1980 na  4.8  4.6 
1981 na  4.8  4.6 
1982 na  4.7  4.6 
1983 na  4.7  4.6 
1984 na  4.7  4.5 
1985 na  4.6  4.5 
1986 na  4.5  4.5 
1987 na  4.5  4.4 
1988 na  4.5  4.4 
1989 na  4.5  4.4 
1990 na  4.3  4.2 
1991 6.0  4.2  4.1 
1992 5.5  4.2  4.1 
1993 5.5  4.1  4.0 
1994 5.5  3.9  3.8 
1995 5.5  3.7  3.7 
1996 5.5  3.6  3.6 
1997 5.5  3.6  3.6 
1998 5.5  3.5  3.7 
1999 5.5  3.4  3.4 
2000 5.5  3.4  3.4 
2001 5.5  3.3  3.3 
2002 5.5  2.8  2.9 
2003 4.0  2.8  3.0 
2004 3.5  na  na 
2005 3.5  na  na 
2006 3.5  na  na 
2007 3.5  na  na 
2008 3.5  na  na   75
Post 
year 
Entry Public  Ownership 
Croatia  EU-15 
average 
OECD 




1975 na  4.4 4.3  na  5.1  5.0 
1976 na  4.4 4.3  na  5.1  5.0 
1977 na  4.4 4.3  na  5.1  4.9 
1978 na  4.4 4.3  na  5.1  4.9 
1979 na  4.4 4.3  na  5.1  4.9 
1980 na  4.4 4.3  na  5.1  4.9 
1981 na  4.4 4.2  na  5.1  4.9 
1982 na  4.2 4.1  na  5.1  4.9 
1983 na  4.2 4.1  na  5.0  4.9 
1984 na  4.2 4.1  na  5.0  4.9 
1985 na  4.2 4.1  na  5.0  4.9 
1986 na  4.0 4.0  na  5.0  4.9 
1987 na  4.0 3.9  na  4.9  4.8 
1988 na  4.0 3.9  na  4.9  4.8 
1989 na  4.0 3.9  na  4.9  4.8 
1990 na  3.5 3.5  na  4.8  4.7 
1991 6.0  3.4 3.4  6.0  4.8  4.7 
1992 6.0  3.3 3.3  5.0  4.8  4.7 
1993 6.0  3.3 3.3  5.0  4.8  4.7 
1994 6.0  3.0 3.0  5.0  4.6  4.6 
1995 6.0  2.8 2.8  5.0  4.5  4.5 
1996 6.0  2.6 2.7  5.0  4.5  4.5 
1997 6.0  2.6 2.7  5.0  4.5  4.5 
1998 6.0  2.6 2.8  5.0  4.5  4.5 
1999 6.0  2.4 2.4  5.0  4.5  4.5 
2000 6.0  2.4 2.3  5.0  4.4  4.4 
2001 6.0  2.3 2.2  5.0  4.3  4.4 
2002 6.0  1.3 1.5  5.0  4.3  4.4 
2003 3.0  1.3 1.7  5.0  4.2  4.3 
2004 2.0 na  na  5.0  na  na 
2005 2.0 na  na  5.0  na  na 
2006 2.0 na  na  5.0  na  na 
2007 2.0 na  na  5.0  na  na 
2008 2.0 na  na  5.0  na  na 
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Rail 




1975 na  6.0  5.9 
1976 na  6.0  5.9 
1977 na  6.0  5.9 
1978 na  6.0  5.9 
1979 na  6.0  5.9 
1980 na  6.0  5.8 
1981 na  6.0  5.8 
1982 na  6.0  5.8 
1983 na  6.0  5.8 
1984 na  6.0  5.8 
1985 na  6.0  5.8 
1986 na  6.0  5.8 
1987 na  6.0  5.7 
1988 na  5.9  5.6 
1989 na  5.9  5.6 
1990 na  5.9  5.6 
1991 6.0  5.9  5.6 
1992 6.0  5.9  5.6 
1993 6.0  5.8  5.5 
1994 6.0  5.5  5.3 
1995 6.0  5.4  5.2 
1996 6.0  5.2  4.8 
1997 6.0  5.0  4.7 
1998 5.6  4.8  4.5 
1999 5.6  4.6  4.4 
2000 5.6  4.4  4.2 
2001 5.6  4.3  4.1 
2002 5.6  4.1  3.9 
2003 5.6  4.0  3.8 
2004 5.6  na  na 
2005 5.6  na  na 
2006 5.3  na  na 
2007 5.3  na  na 
2008 5.3  na  na 
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Industry  Rail 
year 
Entry  Public Ownership  Market Structure  Vertical Integration 
Croatia  EU-15 
average 
OECD 
average  Croatia  EU-15 
average 
OECD 
average  Croatia  EU-15 
average 
OECD 




1975  na 6.0  6.0 na 6.0  5.7 na 6.0  5.7 na 6.0  6.0 
1976  na 6.0  6.0 na 6.0  5.7 na 6.0  5.7 na 6.0  6.0 
1977  na 6.0  6.0 na 6.0  5.7 na 6.0  5.7 na 6.0  6.0 
1978  na 6.0  6.0 na 6.0  5.7 na 6.0  5.7 na 6.0  6.0 
1979  na 6.0  6.0 na 6.0  5.7 na 6.0  5.7 na 6.0  6.0 
1980  na 6.0  5.9 na 6.0  5.7 na 6.0  5.7 na 6.0  6.0 
1981  na 6.0  5.9 na 6.0  5.7 na 6.0  5.7 na 6.0  6.0 
1982  na 6.0  5.9 na 6.0  5.7 na 6.0  5.7 na 6.0  6.0 
1983  na 6.0  5.9 na 6.0  5.7 na 6.0  5.7 na 6.0  6.0 
1984  na 6.0  5.9 na 6.0  5.7 na 6.0  5.7 na 6.0  6.0 
1985  na 6.0  5.9 na 6.0  5.7 na 6.0  5.7 na 6.0  6.0 
1986  na 6.0  5.9 na 6.0  5.7 na 6.0  5.7 na 6.0  6.0 
1987  na 6.0  5.6 na 6.0  5.6 na 6.0  5.4 na 6.0  6.0 
1988  na 6.0  5.6 na 6.0  5.6 na 6.0  5.4 na 5.8  5.9 
1989  na 6.0  5.6 na 6.0  5.6 na 6.0  5.4 na 5.8  5.9 
1990  na 6.0  5.6 na 6.0  5.6 na 6.0  5.4 na 5.8  5.9 
1991  6.0 6.0  5.6 6.0 6.0  5.6 6.0 6.0  5.4 6.0 5.7  5.8 
1992  6.0 6.0  5.6 6.0 6.0  5.6 6.0 6.0  5.4 6.0 5.6  5.7 
1993  6.0 5.7  5.4 6.0 6.0  5.5 6.0 5.9  5.4 6.0 5.6  5.6 
1994  6.0 5.5  5.2 6.0 5.8  5.2 6.0 5.9  5.4 6.0 4.9  5.2 
1995  6.0 5.5  5.2 6.0 5.7  5.1 6.0 5.8  5.3 6.0 4.7  5.0 
1996  6.0 5.0  4.6 6.0 5.6  4.9 6.0 5.8  5.2 6.0 4.4  4.6 
1997  6.0 5.0  4.6 6.0 5.6  4.9 6.0 5.6  5.1 6.0 4.0  4.2 
1998  6.0 4.8  3.9 6.0 5.5  4.9 6.0 5.4  4.9 4.5 3.5  4.2 
1999  6.0 4.8  4.4 6.0 5.5  4.9 6.0 5.1  4.7 4.5 3.3  4.0 
2000  6.0 4.3  4.1 6.0 5.4  4.9 6.0 4.8  4.5 4.5 3.2  3.9 
2001  6.0 4.2  4.0 6.0 5.3  4.8 6.0 4.5  4.3 4.5 3.0  3.9 
2002  6.0 4.1  3.9 6.0 5.3  4.8 6.0 4.2  4.1 4.5 2.9  3.8 
2003  6.0 4.0  3.2 6.0 5.2  4.5 6.0 4.0  3.4 4.5 2.9  3.7 
2004  6.0  na na  6.0  na na  6.0  na na  4.5  na na 
2005  6.0  na na  6.0  na na  6.0  na na  4.5  na na 
2006  6.0  na na  6.0  na na  6.0  na na  3.0  na na 
2007  6.0  na na  6.0  na na  6.0  na na  3.0  na na 
2008  6.0  na na  6.0  na na  6.0  na na  3.0  na na   78
Road 




1975 na  5.2  4.8 
1976 na  5.2  4.8 
1977 na  5.2  4.8 
1978 na  5.2  4.8 
1979 na  5.2  4.8 
1980 na  5.2  4.8 
1981 na  5.2  4.7 
1982 na  5.1  4.7 
1983 na  5.1  4.4 
1984 na  5.0  4.2 
1985 na  4.9  4.1 
1986 na  4.7  4.0 
1987 na  4.3  3.6 
1988 na  4.0  3.2 
1989 na  3.2  2.7 
1990 na  3.2  2.5 
1991 0.5  3.0  2.4 
1992 0.5  2.6  2.1 
1993 0.5  2.5  2.1 
1994 0.5  2.5  2.0 
1995 0.5  2.4  1.9 
1996 0.5  2.4  1.8 
1997 0.5  2.3  1.8 
1998 1.3  2.1  1.7 
1999 1.3  2.0  1.7 
2000 1.3  1.9  1.6 
2001 1.3  1.9  1.6 
2002 1.3  1.8  1.5 
2003 1.3  1.7  1.5 
2004 1.3  na  na 
2005 2.0  na  na 
2006 2.0  na  na 
2007 2.0  na  na 
2008 2.0  na  na 
 




Croatia  EU-15 
average 
OECD 




1975 na  4.8  4.4  na  5.4  5.0 
1976 na  4.8  4.4  na  5.4  5.0 
1977 na  4.8  4.4  na  5.4  5.0 
1978 na  4.8  4.4  na  5.4  5.0 
1979 na  4.8  4.4  na  5.4  5.0 
1980 na  4.8  4.4  na  5.4  5.0 
1981 na  4.7  4.4  na  5.4  5.0 
1982 na  4.7  4.3  na  5.4  4.9 
1983 na  4.7  4.0  na  5.3  4.7 
1984 na  4.7  3.6  na  5.2  4.6 
1985 na  4.5  3.5  na  5.1  4.5 
1986 na  4.4  3.4  na  4.9  4.4 
1987 na  3.7  3.0  na  4.7  4.1 
1988 na  3.5  2.7  na  4.5  3.7 
1989 na  2.5  2.0  na  3.9  3.3 
1990 na  2.4  1.9  na  3.9  3.1 
1991 0.0  2.3  1.8  1.0  3.6  2.9 
1992 0.0  1.8  1.4  1.0  3.3  2.7 
1993 0.0  1.7  1.4  1.0  3.3  2.7 
1994 0.0  1.6  1.3  1.0  3.2  2.6 
1995 0.0  1.5  1.1  1.0  3.2  2.5 
1996 0.0  1.4  1.1  1.0  3.2  2.5 
1997 0.0  1.3  1.0  1.0  3.2  2.5 
1998 0.0  1.1  0.7  2.5  3.1  2.8 
1999 0.0  1.0  0.6  2.5  3.0  2.6 
2000 0.0  1.0  0.6  2.5  2.9  2.6 
2001 0.0  0.9  0.6  2.5  2.8  2.5 
2002 0.0  0.9  0.5  2.5  2.7  2.4 
2003 0.0  0.8  0.5  2.5  2.6  2.5 
2004 0.0  na  na  2.5  na  na 
2005 0.0  na  na  4.0  na  na 
2006 0.0  na  na  4.0  na  na 
2007 0.0  na  na  4.0  na  na 
2008 0.0  na  na  4.0  na  na 
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All but public ownership 
year  Croatia EU-15  average OECD  average 
1975 na  5.5  5.3 
1976 na  5.5  5.3 
1977 na  5.5  5.3 
1978 na  5.5  5.3 
1979 na  5.5  5.3 
1980 na  5.5  5.3 
1981 na  5.5  5.3 
1982 na  5.5  5.2 
1983 na  5.5  5.2 
1984 na  5.5  5.2 
1985 na  5.4  5.1 
1986 na  5.4  5.1 
1987 na  5.3  4.9 
1988 na  5.2  4.8 
1989 na  5.1  4.7 
1990 na  5.0  4.6 
1991 5.2  4.8  4.4 
1992 5.1  4.7  4.3 
1993 5.1  4.2  4.0 
1994 5.1  4.0  3.8 
1995 5.1  3.7  3.5 
1996 5.1  3.6  3.3 
1997 5.1  3.4  3.2 
1998 5.1  3.2  3.0 
1999 5.1  2.8  2.6 
2000 5.1  2.6  2.4 
2001 4.9  2.3  2.2 
2002 4.6  2.0  1.9 
2003 3.6  1.8  1.8 
2004 3.3  na  na 
2005 3.4  na  na 
2006 3.1  na  na 
2007 2.9  na  na 
2008 2.9  na  na 
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Entry barriers 
year  Croatia EU-15  average OECD  average 
1975 na  5.6  5.5 
1976 na  5.6  5.5 
1977 na  5.6  5.5 
1978 na  5.6  5.5 
1979 na  5.6  5.4 
1980 na  5.6  5.4 
1981 na  5.6  5.4 
1982 na  5.5  5.4 
1983 na  5.5  5.3 
1984 na  5.5  5.3 
1985 na  5.5  5.2 
1986 na  5.4  5.2 
1987 na  5.4  5.0 
1988 na  5.3  4.9 
1989 na  5.3  4.8 
1990 na  5.1  4.7 
1991 4.8  4.9  4.5 
1992 4.8  4.8  4.4 
1993 4.8  4.3  4.0 
1994 4.8  4.1  3.9 
1995 4.8  3.8  3.6 
1996 4.8  3.5  3.3 
1997 4.8  3.4  3.2 
1998 5.1  3.2  2.9 
1999 5.1  2.6  2.4 
2000 5.1  2.3  2.1 
2001 5.1  2.1  2.0 
2002 4.9  1.7  1.7 
2003 3.9  1.6  1.6 
2004 3.6  na  na 
2005 4.0  na  na 
2006 4.0  na  na 
2007 3.8  na  na 
2008 3.8  na  na 
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Public ownership 
year  Croatia EU-15  average OECD  average 
1975 na  5.2  4.7 
1976 na  5.2  4.7 
1977 na  5.2  4.7 
1978 na  5.2  4.7 
1979 na  5.2  4.7 
1980 na  5.2  4.7 
1981 na  5.2  4.7 
1982 na  5.2  4.7 
1983 na  5.2  4.7 
1984 na  5.1  4.7 
1985 na  5.1  4.7 
1986 na  5.1  4.6 
1987 na  5.0  4.5 
1988 na  5.0  4.5 
1989 na  4.9  4.4 
1990 na  4.9  4.3 
1991 5.9  4.8  4.2 
1992 5.8  4.7  4.1 
1993 5.8  4.6  4.0 
1994 5.8  4.5  3.9 
1995 5.8  4.3  3.8 
1996 5.8  4.2  3.7 
1997 5.8  4.0  3.5 
1998 5.8  4.0  3.5 
1999 5.6  3.7  3.3 
2000 5.6  3.4  3.1 
2001 5.3  3.3  3.0 
2002 5.3  3.3  3.0 
2003 5.1  3.2  3.2 
2004 5.1  na  na 
2005 5.0  na  na 
2006 5.0  na  na 
2007 5.0  na  na 
2008 4.7  na  na 
 
 





This Annex contains necessary explanations of the data provided in the questionnaire. First the 
most important legislation in force is listed, which is followed by brief explanations we 
considered necessary.  
Only a selection of legislation in force is listed, since the final provisions of existing legislation 
provide references to previous acts. Only in road freight different approach was used. The reason 
is that in the 1990-ies  separate laws regulated domestic and international transport. As a result, 
the legislation in force does not provide sufficient reference on previous acts regulating the 
sector. 
In several cases (telecom, electricity and gas market) explicit legal provisions diverged from 
situation in the market. In cases where licences are needed, number of licences issued was used as 
a criterion on weather competition exists (as opposed to the legal provision which does not 
explicitly prohibit establishment of competition). These cases are explained in more details in 
notes below.  
 
 
1. TELECOM  SECTOR: 
 
1.1.  Selected Legal Acts – Telecom  
 
 
￿  Telecommunications Act (Official Gazette 122/03; 158/03; 60/04) 
￿  Act on Amendments to the Telecommunications Act (NN 70/05) 
￿  Act on Privatisation of Croatian Telecommunications (NN 65/99,68/01) 
￿  Act on Division of Croatian Post and Telecommunications into Croatian Post and 
Croatian Telecommunications (NN 101/98) 
￿  Ordinances on Telecommunications Services (NN183/ 04) 
￿  Ordinances on Basic Telecommunications Services (NN 123/05) 
￿  Ordinances on Number Transferability and Operator Reselection (NN 183/04) 






According to the Telecommunications Act  (Official Gazette  No75/1999. Art 98 par. 4), HT -
Hrvatske telekomunikacije d.d. (Croatian Telecom) had exclusive rights until 31 December 2002 
in fixed network, public voice service and international telecom services (Official Gazette   
76/1999,  Art 98, par 4. and 5)  
Services in fixed telecommunication networks (local, long distance and international) are 
formally liberalised from 1 January 2003.  
However, amendments to the Telecommunications Act (Official Gazette No 68/2001) define 
transition period until the end of 2004. During transition period Croatian Telecom has not 
obligation to enable access to local loop.  
Individual licence is needed for participation in telecom market. Until the end of  2004,  only HT 
had the licence, and we used the licence as a legal condition (and not merely the law) for 
establishing competition (in both fixed and mobile market). As late in 2003 two additional   84
licences were issued (H1 Telekom in December 2004 and OT- Optima Telekom in November 
2004), we identify 2005 as year when competition started.  Currently, there are 10 operators that 
technically and legally can perform at fixed telecom market. 
 
The same criterion is applied in mobile market. According to the 1994 Telecommunication Act 
(Art. 12.2),  entry into mobile market is possible provided that company has concession issued by 
the Telecommunication Council . Vipnet  eceived concession in September 1998 and started 
operation in 1999, as a second GSM operator in Croatia (the first being HT). The third licence 
was issued in December 2004 (TELE 2).  
As technical preconditions for participation in international mobile market existed, the 
liberalization of international telephone market started in 2003, the second operator being Vipnet 
(i.e. mobile operator)  
 
State ownership 





For market structure we used data from research on telecom market conducted by Competition 
Agency . We consider HT as incumbent operator and all the other operators as new entrants. 
However, it should be noted that Vipnet (2nd mobile operator) is considered as operator with 
significant market share (OG 134/07). Market share of  third mobile operator Tele 2 (that entered 
the market in 2005) was less than 5% in 2005 and 2006 (according to Competition Agency) and 
roughly 8 % in 2007 (according to Tele 2 data).  
 
 
2. POST  
 
2.1.  Selected Legal Acts – Postal Services 
 
￿  Postal Act (Official Gazette 172/03, 15/04) 
￿  Act on Amendments to the Postal Act (OG 92/05) 
￿  Establishment of a Croatian National Postal and Telecommunications Company Act (OG 
42/90, 61/91, 109/93)  
Note:  the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia has annulled Article 16 of this Act 
￿   Postal Ordinances (OG 37/95, 89/95, 5/96) 
￿   Ordinances on the Postal System of the Public Operator (OG 5/05) 
￿    Division of Croatian Post and Telecommunications into Croatian Post and Croatian 
Telecommunications Act (OG 101/98)  
￿    Ordinances on General Conditions for the Provision of Postal Services (OG 
37/95;151/04) 
￿   Ordinances on Amendments to Ordinances on General  Conditions for the Provision of 
Postal Services (OG  122/05) 
￿   Ordinances on Licence Fee for the Provision of General Postal Services (OG 20/04) 
 
 
2.2. Notes  
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According to the 1994 law on postal services (Official Gazette 53/94) public operator  (Croatian 
Post, HP-Hrvatska pošta d.d.) held monopoly for all postal services. Excluded were only parcels 
and printed materials sent directly  by publishers.  
The 2003 law provides legal ground for liberalization of postal services. Croatian Posts is the 
provider of Universal Postal Service provider, but its monopoly was reduced from postal items up 
to 2000 g to postal items up to 100 g.  
Croatian Post (Hrvatska posta d.d.) operates on the basis of direct authorisation by law.  
Postal services which are outside the reserved area but inside the universal service area can be 
provided by private operators (legal persons only) on the basis of a licence to be issued by the 
Council for Postal Services which is the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) in this field. The 
issuing (or withdrawal) of a licence is an administrative act. The licence holder needs to pay an 
annual licence fee. The USP is exempt from paying such fee. For the provision of courier services 
no licence is necessary; instead a notification is sufficient. 
Croatian Post is obliged (since 1 January 2005) to ensure a separation of accounting for the 
reserved postal services from the one for the non-reserved postal services. Within the non-
reserved postal services the accounting for universal postal services needs to be kept separate 
from the one for non-universal postal services and courier services. Pursuant to  the Postal Act, 
the public operator must not subsidize postal services under free market conditions with revenues 





3.1.  Selected Legal Acts - Railway Transport 
 
￿  Law on Agency for Railway Service Market Regulation (OG 79/07) 
￿  The Railway Act (OG 123/03, 194/03, 30/04) 
￿  The Railway Safety Act (OG 40/07) 
￿  Croatian Railways Division Law (OG 153/05) 
 
￿  Rulebook on Railway Infrastructure (OG 127/05) 
￿  Rulebook on criteria and procedures for certificates on safety for railway infrastucture 
management (OG 127/05) 
￿  Rulebook on criteria and procedures for certificates on safety for railway transport (OG 
127/05) 
￿  Rulebook on criteria and procedures for railway transport licences and railway 
infrastructure management licences (OG 127/05) 
 
￿  Act on the ratification of Protocol of 3 June 1999 for the modification of the Convention 
concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF) of 9 May 1980 (1999 Protocol) and the 
Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF) of 9 May 1980, as amended by 
the Protocol of 3 June 1999 (Official Gazette - International Agreements (OG-IA)12/2000) 
￿  Agreement on regulating border railway transport between the Government of the 
Republic of Croatia and the Government of the Republic of Hungary (OG 5/95). 
￿  Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Government of 




Croatia has adopted the Railway Act (Official Gazette  123/03, 194/03 and 30/04), which entered 
into force on 1 January 2006. The implementing legislative framework consists of four rulebooks   86
(OG 127/05) related to railway infrastructure, to railway infrastructure operation safety 
certificates, to requirements and procedures for issuing rail transport service licences and railway 
infrastructure operation . 
The Railway Act is based on the principle of separation of railway transport and railway 
infrastructure. Pursuant to this act, the Croatian Railway division law (OG 153/05) defines how 
the national company Hrvatske željeznice (HŽ) was divided in mid 2006, i.e. 
-￿one for infrastructure management (maintenance and construction); 
-￿one for passenger transport services; 
-￿one for freight transport; 
-￿one for train traction. 
These four companies are under a holding, which is 100% owned by Government. The separation 
of accounts between infrastructure and transport services is in force in HŽ since 1998.  
 
 
4. AIR PASSANGER TRANSPORT 
 
4.1. Selected Legal Acts– Air Passenger Transport  
 
- Act on Amendments to the Air Traffic Act (46/2007)  




The Air Traffic Act (OG 132/98 and 178/04) covers almost entirely the air transport sector. 
Croatia signed the European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) agreement in 2006. Market access 
is regulated by bilateral air services agreements concluded by Croatia, and by the ECAA 
agreement.  
Croatia Airlines is the sole scheduled national air carrier and it receives state aid notably through 
Public Service Obligation (PSO).  
 
Restrictions to the liberalization of the domestic aviation market are defined by art. 15 par. 1 of 
the Air Traffic Act (OG 132/98, 46/2007). In case of conflict of interest among carriers, the 
Ministry can  decide which airline is allowed to operate on domestic route.  
 
 
5. ROAD FREIGHT TRANSPORT 
 
5.1. Selected Legal Acts  – Road Freight Transport  
 
￿  Road Transport Act,(OG 178/04, 48/05, 151/05 and 111/06) 
￿  Road Transport Act  (OG 36/98 and 83/02 – Consolidated version OG 26/03) 
￿  Act on the Domestic Road Transport  ( OG 77/1992, 26/1993) 
￿  Act on Road Transport (OG 44/89, 47/89) 
 





In 1990-ies, separate laws regulated international and national road freight business.    87
Different procedures have been applied for national allowances and international licences. The 
1992 Law on internal road transport (Official Gazette 77/1992) defined procedure for obtaining 
national freight allowance. Procedure for obtaining allowance for participation in national freight 
business has been simpler and cheaper compared to the procedure for licence  necessary for 
international road freight business (based on the Law on International Road Transport, OG 
53/91).  
The allowance for national freight business has been issued at local level, and for the purpose of 
the database, we consider it as a permit from the government. 
By adoption Road Transport Act in 1998 (OG 36/1998) the activities in domestic and 
international road freight have been partially integrated. Still, the domestic allowances had been 
issued at the level of counties and by the City of Zagreb, while the international licences have 
been issued by the Ministry of Transport (in its headquarters and in the local offices). Based on 
the 1998 Act, Chamber of Commerce (HGK) and Chamber of Traders and Crafts (HOK) have 
adopted a rulebook defining procedure for obtaining professional qualification in the field of road 
transport (OG  18/1999). We consider this as start of involvement of professional bodies or 
representatives of trade and commercial interest in specifying or enforcing entry regulation. It 
should be noted, however, that the Chamber of Commerce has been in charge for distribution of 
international licences in the period 1992-1998 based on the Law on international road transport 
(Official Gazette 53/91) and Rulebook on the procedure and criteria for distribution of 
international licences  (OG 21/1992). As this was not relevant for operators active only on 
domestic market, we consider that professional bodies have been involved in specifying entry 
regulations since 1998.  
Current law (OG 178/04, 48/05, 151/05 and 111/06)  defines five groups of requirements for 
admission into road transport: good repute, financial standing, professional competence, access to 
the vehicle (ownership or right to use it, based on the contract) and access to a parking place (own 
or rented parking places).  These criteria we consider as technical and financial fitness and   
compliance with public safety operators.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that Professional Association of road freight transport was established 




6.1. Selected Legal Acts  – Electricity  
￿  Electricity Market Act (OG 177/04, 76/07)  
￿  Grid Code (OG 36/06)  
￿  Electricity Market Rules (OG 135/06) 
 
6.2. Notes 
Unitl 2001, when package of 5 energy laws was adopted (OG 68/01), sector was regulataed by 
the Act on electricity industry (OG 31/90, 47/90, 61/91, 26/93, 78/94, 105/99, 111/99 and 51/01). 
It defined that electricity company (Hrvatske elektroprivrede) might receives its income by 
offering transport services for other companies (Art. 13 par 2, OG 31/90), which provides for 
negotiated TPA. The 2001 Electricity Act provided for regulatred TPA and for liberalisation of 
electricity market. Electricity market rules, enabling establishment of wholesale market, firstly 
based on bilateral contracts (over the counter- OTC market) were adopted  in 2003 (OG 193/03, 
198 /03). New rules adopted in 2006 (OG 135/2006) that define that there is one electricity 
market in Croatia.  
Consumption threshold in ordeer to be able to choose supplier have been defined by Electricity 
Market Law (initially OG 68/01, replaced by OG 177/04, 76/07)  
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7. GAS 
7.1. Selected Legal Acts  – Gas  
 
-  Gas Market Act (OG 40/07) 
-  Decision on the gas distribution tariffs (OG 116/97) 
-  Decsion of the gas price for the gas suppliers (OG 77/07) 
-  Gas supply tariff system (OG 34/07, 47/07) 
-  Gas distribution tariff system ( OG 32/96, 3/07)  
-  Basic market condtitions for access to the gas transport system (OG 03/2004)  
-  Grid code for access to the  transport system (OG 126/03)  




In 2001 the first Gas Market Act (OG 68/01 and OG 97/05) was adopted, as a part of the energy 
package. It recognised  3 basic segments of the industry: gas distribution, gas production/Import 
and gas transport. The law provided for regulated third party access to transport, and also for the 
first phase of liberalisation and vertical separation.  
 
Vertical integration 
By 2001 distribution and supply of gas were treated as communal activities, separated (ownership 
separation) from transport and production/import. Based on the reform initiated in 2001,  gas 
transport (PLINACRO) was legally separated from production/import in 2001. At the time 
transport company was registered as a member of INA group, 100% owned by INA Plc, while 
from March 11 2003 the company became a state-owned.  
As a result, in the period 2001-2007 three segments of the industry were vertically separated: 
production/import, transport and distribution/supply. 
2007 law recognized additional activities in the gas market (transport system operator, 
distribution system operator, storage system operator, supply, trader) and provides for further 
vertical separation. 
According to the regulatory agency, it was planned that during 2007 distribution and supply 
separate account. However, there are no reliable information on implementation.  
 
Despite the fact that production/import and transport were vertically separated from distribution 
and supply, we consider that there was no separation until 2001. As a criterion for separation we 
use next (upstream or downstream) activity.  I.e. we consider that there was initial separation in 
2001 (production/transport/distribution). The distribution and supply are characterized by large 
number of companies (39), that are local monopolies, with different forms of structure and 
ownership. The largest one (Gradska plinara Zagreb) covers appx. 35.6% of Croatian gas market. 





The 2001 Gas Market Act (OG 68/01) defined that consumers  that are buying gas as a fuel for 
producing electricity, consumers that are buying gas for co-generation plants (electricity and heat) 
and consumers whose consumption exceeds 100 000 000 m3 of gas are free to choose supplier.  
Government was also entitled to define  additional criteria for opening of the market, and since 
2004 iron and steel companies can choose their suppliers (OG 101/2004).The 2007 law decreased 
consumption threshold in order to be able to choose a supplier (from 100000000 m3 gas to   89
25000000m3 gas a year ). From July 2007 all non-household customers are free to choose 
supplier, while from June 2008  all customers are free to choose their supplier.  
Regarding competition in gas production/import sector, 2007 law defines that  INA d.d. is obliged 
to provide gas for tariff customers. It is only INA who has the licence for gas production/import 
and it is the sole concessionary on over 50 oil and gas production fields in continental Croatia. 
Here, as in the telecom sector, we applied conservative approach. I.e. despite the fact that there is 
no explicit legal provision limiting competition, based on the fact that INA is the sole 
concessionary  to production and the only licence holder for production and import, we consider 
it sufficient to recognize that regulations restricts the number of competitors.    90
Annex III: Regulation and Convergence – Regression results 
 
RE-FE Baseline Comparison, ETCR Index 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  FE  RE GLS  RE GLS  RE GLS  baseline RE 
    lrgdppc_ppp lrgdppc_ppp lrgdppc_ppp lrgdppc_ppp lrgdppc_ppp 
L.lrgdppc_ppp  0.7335*** 0.8718*** 0.8777*** 0.8772*** 0.9472*** 
  [0.0522] [0.0259] [0.0332] [0.0328] [0.0109] 
linv_gdp  0.1495*** 0.1663*** 0.1640*** 0.1557*** 0.1721*** 
  [0.0337] [0.0353] [0.0360] [0.0361] [0.0356] 
L.linv_gdp  -0.1360*** -0.1614*** -0.1664*** -0.1589*** -0.1684*** 
  [0.0311] [0.0332] [0.0340] [0.0336] [0.0345] 
L.lropenness 0.0345  0.0078  0.0098* 0.0087*  0.0189*** 
 [0.0216]  [0.0051]  [0.0051] [0.0051] [0.0040] 
lyagri_empl  -0.0514***  -0.0035 -0.0002 0.0001  0.0015 
  [0.0172]  [0.0054] [0.0067] [0.0066] [0.0034] 
lyrule_law  0.1007 0.0067 -0.0085 0.0056 -0.0206 
  [0.0629] [0.0244] [0.0235] [0.0252] [0.0196] 
lpatent_labor  -0.0074 -0.0019 -0.0016 -0.0014  -0.0040* 
  [0.0084] [0.0022] [0.0027] [0.0027] [0.0022] 
lfin_risk  0.0346 0.0255 0.0298 0.0321 0.0215 
  [0.0235] [0.0227] [0.0246] [0.0241] [0.0237] 
lempl_priv 0.0156  0.0770*** 0.0711*** 0.0697*** 0.0978*** 
 [0.0606]  [0.0193] [0.0228] [0.0215] [0.0192] 
lyfertility -0.0085  0.0708*** 0.0680*** 0.0662*** 0.0488*** 
 [0.0274]  [0.0116] [0.0125] [0.0123] [0.0102] 
lfis_burden  0.0347**  0.0102 0.0103 0.0103 0.0058 
  [0.0142]  [0.0114] [0.0113] [0.0114] [0.0107] 
lave_yr_sch -0.0458  0.0406*** 0.0383*** 0.0359***  0.0293** 
 [0.1565]  [0.0135] [0.0138] [0.0138] [0.0124] 
L.lelect_pc  -0.0298*  0.0052 0.0055 0.0073  0.0155*** 
  [0.0174]  [0.0066] [0.0068] [0.0065] [0.0060] 
etcr_ave  -0.3832*** -0.1709***          
  [0.0939] [0.0599]     
etcr_lrgdp  0.0388*** 0.0176***     
  [0.0094] [0.0059]     
etcr_pub_ownership     -0.0531  -0.0088  
     [0.0882]  [0.0883]   
etcr_pub_lrgdp     0.0054  0.0009   
     [0.0087]  [0.0087]   
etcr_other_pub       -0.1632**   
       [0.0749]   
etcr_other_lrgdp       0.0167**   
       [0.0075]   
etcr_entry_barrier    -0.1168    
     [0.0748]     
etcr_entry_lrgdp     0.0119     
         [0.0075]       
Constant  2.6194*** 0.6356**  0.6244 0.6161  -0.2297* 
   [0.7630] [0.3060] [0.3897] [0.3824] [0.1294] 
Observations  132 132 132 132 132 
Number  of  id  16 16 16 16 16 
R-squared  0.9912             
Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Year dummies are excluded in the table. 
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    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Sys GMM  Sys GMM  Sys GMM  Sys GMM 
   lrgdppc_ppp  lrgdppc_ppp  lrgdppc_ppp  lrgdppc_ppp 
L.lrgdppc_ppp  0.9390*** 0.8170*** 0.8277*** 0.8380*** 
  [0.0279] [0.0476] [0.0736] [0.0722] 
linv_gdp  0.0363 0.0113 0.0364 0.0119 
  [0.0258] [0.0231] [0.0269] [0.0234] 
lropenness  0.0237*** 0.0139*  0.0186** 0.0142** 
  [0.0070] [0.0083] [0.0077] [0.0069] 
lyfertility  0.0580*** 0.0884*** 0.0835*** 0.0849*** 
  [0.0184] [0.0169] [0.0169] [0.0173] 
yagri_empl -0.0012  -0.0017  -0.0015  -0.002 
  [0.0012] [0.0014] [0.0015] [0.0014] 
lpatent_labor  -0.0072**  -0.004 -0.0033 -0.005 
  [0.0031]  [0.0036] [0.0046] [0.0046] 
lyrule_law -0.0559  -0.0305  -0.0654  -0.0349 
  [0.0382] [0.0411] [0.0400] [0.0326] 
lave_yr_sch 0.0433  0.0620**  0.0629* 0.0575* 
 [0.0265]  [0.0288]  [0.0360] [0.0327] 
lempl_priv  0.1165*** 0.1175*** 0.1263*** 0.1158*** 
  [0.0363] [0.0308] [0.0409] [0.0357] 
lelect_pc  0.0240**  0.0116 0.0139  0.013 
  [0.0095]  [0.0114] [0.0124] [0.0114] 
lfis_burden  0.0149 0.0234 0.0267 0.0227 
  [0.0165] [0.0145] [0.0172] [0.0142] 
lfin_risk  0.0131 0.0153 0.0002 0.0203 
  [0.0242] [0.0261] [0.0237] [0.0223] 
etcr_ave     -0.2442**       
   [0.0963]    
etcr_lrgdp   0.0248***    
   [0.0096]    
etcr_pub_ownership     -0.1629 -0.0295 
     [0.2057]  [0.1920] 
etcr_pub_lrgdp     0.0163  0.0032 
     [0.0203]  [0.0189] 
etcr_entry_barrier     -0.0407   
     [0.1286]   
etcr_entry_lrgdp     0.004   
     [0.0129]   
etcr_other_pub      -0.172 
      [0.1051] 
etcr_other_lrgdp      0.0174* 
            [0.0105] 
Constant  -0.3573** 0.9660**  0.8069 0.7492 
  [0.1616] [0.4560] [0.6656] [0.6798] 
Observations  122 122 122 122 
Number of id  16  16  16  16 
Robust standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Year dummies are excluded in the table. 
 